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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has dedicated itself to the proposition that political
speech, more than any other category of speech, is deserving of the highest protection.1 A succession of cases amply supports this proposition. In Virginia v.
Black, the Court announced that “lawful political speech [is] at the core of what
the First Amendment is designed to protect.”2 The Court similarly declared in
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy that the First Amendment “has its fullest and most
urgent application” to political speech.3 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Court held that “handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically
controversial viewpoint—is the essence of First Amendment expression” and
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. I am grateful to Maryam Ahranjani and Josh
Kastenberg for generously reviewing the manuscript. I owe particular thanks to Cliff Villa for
extensive comments, and to my assistant, Michael Woods, for his several contributions. I am
grateful for the institutional support of the Professor Pamela Burgy Minzner Award for Faculty
Excellence & Professionalism.
1 For specific instances of how the Court has granted the highest protection to political speech,
see infra Part I.
2 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).
3 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
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that “[n]o form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection.”4 So too
the Court stressed in Buckley v. Valeo that “[t]he First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to . . . political expression.”5 The Court in Texas v. Johnson
emphasized that the speaker who had burned the American flag as a form of
expressive protest “was not . . . prosecuted for the expression of just any idea.”6
Rather, Johnson was, in the Court’s words, “prosecuted for his expression of
dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situated at the core of
our First Amendment values.”7 In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
the Court stated that political speech “lies near the core of the First Amendment.”8 These affirming words in Landmark Communications were recited by
the Supreme Court in other cases, a testament to the Court’s steadfast protection
of political speech as a uniquely deserving category.9 In Mills v. Alabama, the
Court reiterated its support for the priority of political speech: “Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs.”10 The Mills Court added, “This of
course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government,
the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such
matters relating to political processes.”11 As such examples illustrate, political
speech enjoys a coveted place in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
4

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)).
6 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 410–11 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Political speech is the primary object of
First Amendment protection.”). The Court stated in Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee, “There can be no doubt that the expenditures at issue
in this case produce speech at the core of the First Amendment.” 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985).
7 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411.
8 Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978).
9 See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979); Butterworth v. Smith,
494 U.S. 624, 631 (1990). The Court is not alone in its suggestion that political speech merits
the highest protection. Prominent scholars have made similar claims. Laurence Tribe thus argues that “political advocacy” is “the very kind of speech that the First Amendment is meant
to protect most vigorously.” Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. the
Controversy, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 467 (2015). Cass Sunstein stresses that “political
speech belongs in the top tier . . . .” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH 132 (1993). Floyd Abrams writes that “political speech . . . is at the core of the
First Amendment . . . .” Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
77 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/citizens-united-and-its-critics [https://perma.cc
/GDG3-LH5B]. Sunstein and Tribe are left-leaning scholars, but their arguments in favor of
the priority of political speech has found supporters on the right as well. Robert Bork, for
example, has argued that only political speech should be protected. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27–28 (1971).
10 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Other Supreme Court cases have repeated
this language from Mills. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992); Landmark
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. at 838.
11 Mills, 384 U.S. at 218–19.
5
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What is less clear is whether political speech deserves its privileged status.
Undeniably, political speech has helped to advance civil rights and civic enlightenment, but political speech has also been used to justify, among other evils, the
enslavement of blacks12 and the perpetuation of racial segregation.13 That these
abhorrent practices have been formally eradicated is only a partial victory for
political speech given how long they had persisted. If political speech does bend
to the arc of justice, it seems to do so at a disheartening pace. One reason why is
because the so-called marketplace of ideas, while containing political speech that
is in the service of justice, also eagerly feeds a voracious public appetite for political speech that seeks to further oppression.
These days, another problem presented by political speech is its unprecedented propensity to spread misinformation.14 It is a truism that false political
speech has existed as long as politics has existed, but the internet has afforded
political misinformation extraordinary influence.15 Even a casual search of Facebook or Twitter or Google will reveal an endless catalogue of political misinformation. Among the more well-known examples include the following claims:
that the COVID pandemic was manufactured in a lab in China,16 that Democratic
Party leaders along with Hollywood celebrities are part of a cabal of cannibal

12

See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, DEFENDING SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE OLD
SOUTH (2003) (summarizing arguments for slavery by some of America’s most prominent
leaders). See also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406–08 (1856) (denying the
right of black slaves to claim citizenship under the Constitution).
13 See, e.g., NICHOLAS GUYATT, BIND US APART: HOW ENLIGHTENED AMERICANS INVENTED
RACIAL SEGREGATION 2–5 (2016) (discussing political arguments for racial segregation); see
also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (arguing that the Constitution does not
forbid racial segregation), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The
Supreme Court has never formally overruled Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–
18 (1944), the case that justified the racial segregation of Americans of Japanese ancestry.
14 See Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, in THE PERILOUS PUBLIC SQUARE:
STRUCTURAL THREATS TO FREE EXPRESSION TODAY 15, 15–16, 20–21, 25 (David E. Pozen ed.,
2020).
15 See Louis W. Tompros et al., The Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on
Social Networking Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 65, 75–80 (2017); see also WORLD ECON. F., GLOBAL RISKS 2013, at 23, 25 (8th ed.
2013), http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2013/risk-case-1/digital-wildfires-in-a-hyperconnected-world/ [https://perma.cc/XM73-EKLL] (discussing how misinformation spreads
rapidly on social media and can cause panic); Peter Dizikes, Study: On Twitter, False News
Travels Faster Than True Stories, MIT NEWS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://news.mit.edu/2018/study
-twitter-false-news-travels-faster-true-stories-0308 [https://perma.cc/2B7G-FX9V].
16 Aaron Blake, How Misinformation, Filtered Through Fox and Conservative Media,
Quickly Became Trump Administration Policy, WASH. POST (May 11, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/11/how-misinformation-filtered-throughfox-news-conservative-media-became-trump-administration-policy/ [https://perma.cc/H42KK67J]; Melissa Healy, Was the Coronavirus Made in a Wuhan Lab? Here’s What the Genetic
Evidence Shows, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2020-05-09/was-the-coronavirus-made-in-a-wuhan-lab-heres-what-the-geneticevidence-shows [https://perma.cc/4DTW-39HE].
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pedophiles,17 and, most alarmingly, that the presidential election was “rigged,” a
patently baseless charge that nonetheless managed to spur a mob of people to
storm the Capitol Building during the certification of the presidential ballots on
January 6, 2021.18 However pernicious, such speech, by virtue of being political,
would be afforded the highest protection by the Supreme Court.
Against this backdrop, scientific speech—speech that is not political, in
other words—has paradoxically assumed a terrible urgency for America’s viability, including its political viability. Scientists have warned that global warming poses a daunting threat to the Earth’s inhabitants.19 More immediately, scientists have strenuously publicized the danger presented by COVID-19.20
Neither of these examples constitute political speech in a conventional sense, and
therefore would not likely be accorded the highest protection by the Supreme
Court.21 On the other hand, the highest protection would surely have been extended to President Trump’s insistence that global warming is a hoax and that
public officials who accept the validity of global warming are either lying to the
public or absurdly ignorant.22 While proffered by someone who has been unable
17

Moira Donegan, QAnon Conspiracists Believe in a Vast Pedophile Ring: The Truth Is Sadder, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2020, 6:40 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/202
0/sep/20/qanon-conspiracy-child-abuse-truth-trump [https://perma.cc/3CD2-V7SV]; Alex
Henderson, Half of Trump Supporters Believe Baseless QAnon Pedophilia Claim About Democrats: Poll, SALON (Oct. 20, 2020, 7:10 PM), https://www.salon.com/2020/10/20/half-oftrump-supporters-believe-baseless-qanon-pedophilia-claim-about-democrats-poll_partner/
[https://perma.cc/Y5L6-CAYA].
18 See Greg Miller et al., A Mob Insurrection Stoked by False Claims of Election Fraud and
Promises of Violent Restoration, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/national-security/trump-capitol-mob-attack-origins/
[https://perma.cc/B7G5-VGES];
Mike Baker et al., Mob Attack, Incited by Trump, Delays Election Certification, N.Y. TIMES
(July 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/01/06/us/electoral-vote [https://perma.cc
/ZK3S-PH28].
19 See Damian Carrington, Climate Crisis: 11,000 Scientists Warn of “Untold Suffering,”
GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/nov/
05/climate-crisis-11000-scientists-warn-of-untold-suffering [https://perma.cc/8F73-XV5B];
William J Ripple et al., World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency, 70 BIOSCIENCE 8,
8–11 (2020).
20 See Carl Zimmer, U.S. Is Blind to Contagious New Virus Variant, Scientists Warn, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/health/coronavirus-variant-tracking.html [https://perma.cc/4N3V-49GW]; Covid-19: Lockdown Needs to Be Stricter, Scientists Warn, BBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-55602828
[https://perma.cc/3NR7-GY2K].
21 For discussion of how the Court conceives of political speech vis-à-vis other categories of
speech, see infra Part II.
22 President Trump tweeted: “Well, it happened again. Amy Klobuchar announced that she is
running for President, talking proudly of fighting global warming while standing in a virtual
blizzard of snow, ice and freezing temperatures. Bad timing. By the end of her speech she
looked like a Snowman(woman)!” Tim Marcin, Amy Klobuchar Mocks Donald Trump Climate Change Tweet: “I’m Sorry If It Still Snows in the World,” NEWSWEEK (Feb. 11, 2019,
12:53 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/amy-klobuchar-mocks-donald-trump-climate-chan
ge-tweet-still-snows-world-132676 [https://perma.cc/U3Y9-7HRB]. President Trump also
tweeted: “Be careful and try staying in your house. Large parts of the Country are suffering
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to demonstrate even a rudimentary understanding of science,23 these claims concerning science would constitute political speech—and hence would deserve the
highest protection—because they reference public officials and because they are
expressed by the President. The same heightened protection for political speech
would also have applied to President Trump’s unfounded assurance to the public
that COVID-19 is not a grave threat.24 Americans thus find themselves in a disorienting world where factually based scientific speech, more than at any other
time in recent memory, has to compete forcefully with untruthful political speech
in the marketplace of ideas.
Prompted in part by a reflection of these disquieting circumstances, this Article will argue that the Supreme Court’s heightened protection for political
speech is unjustified. The Article is organized as follows. Part I will summarize
how the Supreme Court has privileged political speech. It then will identify two
arguments that have been enlisted by the Court and scholars to support the contention that political speech deserves the highest protection. The Article will refer
to these two arguments as the argument from originalism and the argument from
self-government.25 According to the argument from originalism, the Founding
Fathers of the Republic intended for the First Amendment to grant political

from tremendous amounts of snow and near record setting cold. Amazing how big this system
is. Wouldn’t be bad to have a little of that good old fashioned Global Warming right now!”
Climate Science Misrepresented by President Trump, COLUM. CLIMATE SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE L., https://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/climate-science-misrepresent
ed-president-trump-2 [https://perma.cc/E33A-TD4V].
23 President Trump proffered, the reader will read, that disinfectants and sunlight, if injected
inside a person’s skin, could serve as remedies for COVID. Reality Check Team, Coronavirus:
Trump’s Disinfectant and Sunlight Claims Fact-Checked, BBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52399464 [https://perma.cc/4J8S-GU8L].
24 See Maggie Haberman, Trump Admits Downplaying the Virus Knowing It Was “Deadly
Stuff,” N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/us/politics/woodward-trump-book-virus.html [https://perma.cc/2G8X-J2K8] (“President Trump acknowledged to the journalist Bob Woodward that he knowingly played down the coronavirus earlier
this year even though he was aware it was life-threatening and vastly more serious than the
seasonal flu.”); Emily Bazelon, The First Amendment in the Age of Disinformation, N. Y.
TIMES MAG. (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/magazine/free-speech.
html [https://perma.cc/V8ZF-ZSS8] (“Seven months into the pandemic in America, with
Trump leading the way, coronavirus skeptics continue to mock masks and incorrectly equate
the virus with the flu.”).
25 A sustained discussion of originalism is beyond the scope of this Article, but there are some
sources that the reader may wish to consult as an initial matter. See generally Lawrence B.
Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory (Apr. 28,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825543 [https://perma.cc/R3WH5MKA]; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989);
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204 (1980). See also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW xi (1999); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (2009).
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speech the highest protection.26 Part I will show that there is a dearth of historical
evidence to support the argument from originalism. If anything, as Part I will
suggest, the historical evidence could be read for the proposition that many, and
perhaps most, in the Founding Generation warily regarded political speech—if
voiced by powerful and subversive constituencies—as potentially detrimental to
the survival of the republic, and therefore, as deserving less than consummate
protection.
Other scholars and jurists have pursued a different tact, the argument from
self-government, to brace their claim that political speech warrants the highest
protection.27 The argument from self-government starts from the premise that in
a constitutional democracy, the people themselves are the ultimate source of political authority.28 In order to make the best political decisions, the argument
goes, the people must have available for deliberation a rich array of political
speech.29 Yet, instead of bolstering their claim that political speech should be
granted special protection, the argument from self-government, as Part I will
demonstrate, can lead to the ironic conclusion that political speech should be
punished. Part I will also address an additional problem with the argument from
self-government. So enamored is the argument from self-government with the
category of political speech that the former is willing to provide nearly unfettered
entrance to the latter into the marketplace of ideas. Owing to this virtually indiscriminate access, political misinformation has flooded the marketplace of ideas,
a problem that has grown to seemingly insurmountable proportions in the age of
the internet. By privileging political speech in this undiscerning manner, the argument from self-government has tended to undermine its own purpose: to help
people to make well-informed decisions about their government.
Even if scholars and the Supreme Court were able to defend their position
that political speech deserves the highest protection, Part II will argue that the
effort to afford special protection to political speech is nevertheless unfeasible.
For “political” speech is much too difficult to define. To illustrate this point, Part
II will show how the category of “political” speech can easily bleed into what
the Court styles as obscenity, literary speech, scientific speech, and commercial
speech. Part II will further argue that the very notion of “political” speech is
inherently contestable because speech that is “nonpolitical” can deeply inform
our ideas about what is “political.” That is, Part II will argue at length that no
one realistically forms “political” ideas by studying other “political” ideas alone.
However, by having moored itself to the mission of protecting “political” speech,
26

See discussion infra Section I.A.
For classic discussions of the right of self-government, see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT ix–x (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263. For more contemporary articulations, see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 132; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 2–4 (1993).
28 See infra Section I.B.
29 See infra Section I.B.
27
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the Court has diminished the political discourse that it has formally pledged to
enrich.
Part III will raise a different objection to the Court’s elevation of political
speech. The heightened protection that the Court has granted to political speech
frequently comes at the cost of two essential goods that society values: civility
and dignity. Part III will argue that the Court has failed to justify why political
speech should take precedence over these countervalues. As Part III will elaborate at length, civility is more than polite manners. It is the social adhesive that
holds a community together and is understood as a set of rules for how members
of that community should treat each other. Civility furnishes the moral substance
to scaffold the claims for dignity by the community’s members.30 Part III will
show, however, that the Supreme Court in some of its most monumental cases—
cases that serve as cornerstones for the precedent that political speech is deserving of the highest protection—did not even acknowledge the existence of civility
or dignity. Instead, the Court blissfully empowered political speech to liberate
itself from the moral obligations imposed by civility. As a consequence, political
speech was empowered to excoriate, demean, and verbally assault others, including those who have done nothing to deserve such abuse.
I.

INADEQUATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR WHY POLITICAL SPEECH DESERVES
HEIGHTENED PROTECTION

There are different examples of how the Supreme Court has granted political
speech special protection. One example is how the Court has treated political
speech in comparison to commercial speech.31 The Court has defined commercial speech, variously, as speech that “does no more than propose a commercial
transaction”32 and “expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience.”33 While the references to “no more” and “solely to”
can appear to be attempts to limit the meaning of commercial speech, the definition of commercial speech wrought by the Court is actually quite capacious. Consider how commercial speech encompasses the countless everyday offers to buy
or sell something,34 as well as speech pertaining to the thing that is being bought
or sold.35 Given the ubiquity and importance of commercial transactions in our
30

See infra Part III.
See infra Section I.B.
32 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001).
33 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
34
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (treating as commercial speech advertisements for the price of alcohol); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 791–92 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In every
case in which we have permitted more extensive state regulation on the basis of a commercial
speech rationale the speech being regulated was pure advertising—an offer to buy or sell goods
and services or encouraging such buying and selling.”).
35 See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 63 (1983) (treating as commercial speech unsolicited pamphlets that provide information about the desirability and availability of prophylactics in general or in seller’s products).
31
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lives, one might assume that commercial speech has always been protected by
the Court. In fact, the Court did not protect commercial speech until 1976.36 Even
then, the Court refused to bestow unqualified protection. The Court decided to
protect commercial speech only as long as the speech was not misleading and
did not propose an illegal activity.37 By contrast, the Court protects political
speech even if it advocates illegality, including unlawful violence, or is grossly
misleading.38 Indeed, it is the Court’s position that political speech should be
protected almost regardless of the consequences.39 Notably, the Court has not
conditioned its protection for political speech on the basis of the speech’s perceived value.40
In his now celebrated dissent from 1925 in Gitlow v. New York, Justice
Holmes anticipated how the present Court would protect political speech even if
doing so would result in catastrophe.41 With majestic indifference for the harmful
results that political speech may wrought, Justice Holmes remarked, “If in the
long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech
is that they should be given their chance and have their way.”42 Justice Holmes’s
support for political speech—irrespective of worth—found expression in the
clear and present danger doctrine fashioned by the Court in 1969.43 According to
the doctrine, political speech could lose protection only if it advocated “imminent
lawless action and [was] likely to incite or produce such action.”44 By contrast,
commercial speech that merely proposed an unlawful transaction was denied
protection regardless of whether the speech proposed imminent unlawfulness or
was likely to succeed.45
36

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
37 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64 (denying constitutional protection for commercial
speech that misleads or proposes an unlawful activity).
38 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that political speech will not
be protected if it advocates imminent unlawful conduct and is likely to produce such action);
see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727–28 (2012) (holding that political speech
that is entirely false will be protected).
39 Consider, for example, that political speech is protected even if it advocates violence or is
misleading. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (holding that political speech is protected unless it poses a clear and present danger); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80
(1964) (holding that political speech is exempted from the regular rules of defamation).
40 Political speech will be denied constitutional protection only if it “is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
41 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If in the long run
the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their
chance and have their way.”).
42 Id.
43 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 452.
44 Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
45 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).
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Another way in which the Supreme Court has protected political speech has
been by exempting political speech from categories of unprotected speech. Obscenity is one such unprotected category. The Court denies constitutional protection for speech that is obscene, but if the speech contains “serious” political
value, the Court will spare the otherwise obscene speech from the category of
obscenity.46 The Court will do something similar for the tort of defamation. Defamation is a tort that requires the plaintiff to show that a factually inaccurate
statement about the plaintiff was said by the speaker to a third party and that the
false statement injured plaintiff’s reputation.47 In order for the plaintiff to recover
damages for defamation, the plaintiff must show that the speaker made the defamatory statement in a manner that was negligent with regard to whether the
statement was factually true.48 The standard of proof for defamation is generally
preponderance of the evidence.49 However, the Court has placed additional burdens on the plaintiff if she seeks to recover for a defamatory statement that contains political content.50
If the defamatory statement concerns a public official who was acting within
her official capacity, the Court requires the plaintiff to prove that the speaker
made the false statement with “actual malice.”51 Under the actual malice test, the
plaintiff faces the formidable task of having to show that the speaker made the
false statement in a reckless manner or knew that the statement was false.52 Further, the actual malice test requires the plaintiff to satisfy the much higher standard for clear and convincing evidence, rather than the lower threshold for preponderance of the evidence.53 Through this arrangement, the Court has sought to
protect political speech by largely removing it from the unprotected category of
defamation.54 Such exemption has also been carved out in the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Generally, speech that is deemed an intentional
infliction of emotional distress is unprotected, and the plaintiff may recover damages for such distress. The Court, however, has held that no recovery will be
possible if the speaker’s statement, no matter how hurtful, related to a public
official or public figure and was of public concern.55 As these comparisons to
nonpolitical speech illustrate, the Court has provided political speech with special protection.

46

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973); see also infra Part III.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
48 Id.
49 Id. § 580B reporter’s note.
50 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334–35 (1974).
51 See id.
52 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
53 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
54 The Court has extended the actual malice test to public figures, those, in other words, who
are not government officials. See generally Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
55 See Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990) (reviewing the history of the
Court expanding defamation protections for matters of public concern).
47
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Lamentably, it is also the case that the Supreme Court, along with scholars,
has failed to assemble a serviceable justification for privileging political speech.
A. The Argument from Originalism
One means that judges and scholars have fashioned to underwrite the priority
of political speech is the argument from originalism. The argument from
originalism maintains that political speech is entitled to the highest protection
because the framers of the Constitution or the Founding Fathers wished it so.56
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, Justice Thomas proclaimed in his
dissent, “I begin with a proposition that ought to be unassailable: Political speech
is the primary object of First Amendment protection.”57 For support, Justice
Thomas invoked the authority of the Founding Fathers.58 “The Founders,” he
contended, “sought to protect the rights of individuals to engage in political
speech because a self-governing people depends upon the free exchange of political information.”59 Justice Thomas added that “free exchange should receive
the most protection when it matters the most—during campaigns for elective office.”60 As evidence, Justice Thomas cited James Madison’s “Report on the Resolutions” from 1800.61
The “Report” figured as a critical source of legal authority for Justice
Thomas, but it was up to someone else, a major legal scholar, to integrate Madison into a more developed jurisprudential theory. That scholar was Cass Sunstein. Sunstein is a professor at Harvard Law School, and, in terms of scholarly
reputation, he is perhaps the most prominent law professor in America today.
According to Sunstein, “The view [adopted by the Supreme Court] that political
speech belongs in the top tier receives firm support from history.”62 “By this,”
explained Sunstein, “I refer first to the founding generation’s own theory of free
expression.”63 The term “founding generation” implied the voices of many people, but Sunstein meant only one person: James Madison.64 In fact, Sunstein referred to his own conception of speech as “Madisonian.”65 Sunstein’s choice to
select Madison as the focal point is understandable on some level because

56

See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410–11 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 411.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. Justice Thomas cites the publication date as 1799, but it is actually 1800. See JAMES
MADISON, REPORT ON THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1800), reprinted in MADISON:
WRITINGS 608, 662 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
62 SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 132.
63 Id.
64 See id.
65 Id. at 122.
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Madison made unusually prominent contributions to the Constitution, so much
so that he is now known as the “father of the Constitution.”66
Sunstein’s effort to enlist Madison is not without problems, however. For
Madison simply did not offer much direct commentary about whether political
speech deserved the highest protection. Sunstein relied heavily on Madison’s
“Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts.”67 This was the same document, albeit
under a different title, invoked by Justice Thomas in Nixon.68 Before anything is
said about Madison’s “Report,” an explanation about its historical context is in
order. At the center of this historical context was the French Revolution.69 As
Professor Geoffrey Stone remarked, “No single foreign event affected the United
States more profoundly in the 1790s than the French Revolution and its social,
political, and diplomatic repercussions.”70 At first, Americans lauded the French
Revolution’s ideals of “liberté, fraternité, égalité,” but “[o]ver the next several
years . . . France exploded with religious conflict, civil war, and economic
chaos.”71 Specifically, “[w]ith the executions in 1793 of Louis XVI and Marie
Antoinette, France spiraled into the ‘Reign of Terror.’ ”72 Instead of paving the
way for the rights of the individual, the new French republic “sought to suppress
dissent, de-Christianize the nation, and impose a rigid system of economic egalitarianism.”73 Moreover, France was not satisfied with overturning its own regime. Under Napoleon’s command, France in 1797 had taken control of modernday Belgium, the Rhineland, and the Italian peninsula.74 France was now the
dominant military power in Europe, and Napoleon set his ravenous sights on
Britain.75
Little imagination was required for Americans to believe that they were next.
Vexed with fear, President John Adams asked Congress to set up a provisional
army and to increase the size of the navy to protect against potential French invasion.76 The apprehension felt by the Americans became exacerbated when the
French navy captured American seamen and, between 1796 and 1797, seized 316
ships flying American colors.77 Americans feared that some speakers in the
United States would publicly support Napoleon or French political ideals in a
manner that would erode confidence in the fledgling government of the United
66

See J. William Davis, Book Review, 29 TEX. L. REV. 273, 275 (1950) (reviewing IRVING
BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1800 (1950)).
67 SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at xvii.
68 Id.; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 411 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 21 (2004).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 22.
77 Id. at 21.
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States.78 There was also the fear in America that newly arrived immigrants from
France would subversively denounce the federal government of the United States
in public as part of a campaign to destabilize it.79
It was in this fraught setting that the Sedition Act of 1798, the subject of
Madison’s “Report,” was passed.80 The Act read as follows:
That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and
malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States . . . or
to excite against them . . . the hatred of the good people of the United
States, . . . then such person . . . shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years. 81

To modern eyes, the Act may appear unjust. But sedition laws are hardly
new in the Anglo-American tradition. They have existed in England since 1275,
and their terms were more oppressive than the American variant.82 Unlike their
English counterpart, the American Sedition Act required the government to show
that the speaker acted with malicious intent, and the Act permitted truth as a
defense.83 The American Sedition Act, however, was not met with uniform approval. It was passed in the Congress by a 44 to 41 vote along party lines.84 President Adams’s Federalist Party, with its devotion to a strong central government,
supported the Act, while James Madison’s Republican Party, with its dedication
to states’ rights, opposed it.85
Unwilling to accept defeat, Madison composed his grievances against the
Sedition Act. These grievances were collected in the “Report,” the document that
Professor Sunstein enlisted for his thesis that the framers sought to protect political speech above all others.86 Unfortunately for Sunstein, Madison’s “Report”
was not mainly a disquisition about free speech, but a pointed attack on the Sedition Act, and, much more broadly, what Madison saw as overreaching by the
federal government.87 The “Report” is a relatively long document, but Sunstein
only quoted short excerpts of it. The dearth of quoted material was not owing to
lackadaisical research; there simply was not much in the “Report” that related
directly to free speech. Moreover, neither part that Sunstein excerpted necessarily stood for his proposition that political speech deserved the highest protection.

78

Id. at 26–29.
Id. at 30–31.
80 Id. at 43; An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States (Sedition
Act of 1798), ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
81 Sedition Act of 1798 § 2.
82 STONE, supra note 69, at 42.
83 Id. at 44.
84 Id. at 43.
85 See id. at 25–29, 43.
86 See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 9.
87 MADISON, supra note 61, at 611.
79
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Here is the first excerpt from Madison’s “Report” that Sunstein provided:
“ ‘[T]he right of electing the members of the Government constitutes . . . the essence of a free and responsible government,’ and ‘[t]he value and efficacy of this
right depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the
candidates for the public trust.’ ”88
Because knowledge of political candidates was central for “free and responsible government,” Sunstein drew the conclusion that political speech deserved
more constitutional protection than other speech.89 But Sunstein inferred too
much. Madison’s statements merely amounted to a truism about the nature of
political elections, not a larger philosophical commentary about the value of political speech. To be sure, part of what Sunstein asserted was right: Yes, free
elections were in theory essential to responsible government, and, yes, too, the
people should probably have the right to discuss the merits and demerits of the
candidates so as to make sensible decisions about whom to vote for. Be that as it
may, even if the entirety of Madison’s proposition were taken as true, it does not
follow from anything Madison has said that political speech deserves more protection than commercial speech, religious speech, artistic speech, social speech,
or any other form of speech.
Sunstein excerpted another part from Madison’s “Report”:
Indeed, the power represented by a Sedition Act ought, “more than any other, to
produce universal alarm; because it is levelled against that right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people
thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every
other right.”90

Removed from its historical context, this passage appeared to support Sunstein’s position that political speech deserved the highest protection. Placed in
historical context, however, the meaning of Madison’s words is more constraining. For it must be remembered that Madison was writing the passage not to
expound upon the abstract virtues of political speech. He was writing the passage
to respond to a law that punished people for criticizing the federal government.
Therefore, Madison’s defense of speech incidentally harped on the right to engage in political speech. To put the point differently, if, say, the Sedition Act
forbade speech that was commercial or religious, Madison may very well have
argued against the Act on the grounds that it forbade commercial speech or religious speech, rather than political speech.
From a broader perspective, it might not even be accurate to say that Madison’s “Report” was mainly about speech, political or otherwise. If Madison were
truly concerned about the right of political speech, one must wonder why he
never spoke out against the common law offense of seditious libel that was then
extant in every state—including his own Virginia—which resembled the Federal
88
89
90

SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at xvii.
Id.
Id.
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Sedition Act and was usually more repressive.91 Why did Madison reserve his
criticism for the Sedition Act? The answer was implied in his “Report.” There,
Madison argued that the paramount problem with the Sedition Act was not necessarily its repression of speech, but its encroachment on the rights of states. To
better appreciate this aspect of the “Report,” it is first necessary to clarify that
the “Report” was Madison’s attempt to justify an earlier document that he authored for the Virginia Assembly: the “Virginia Resolutions Against the Alien
and Sedition Acts.”92 The “Resolutions” were written in 1798, and the “Report”
was circulated in 1800.93
If one delves into the substance of Madison’s “Report,” one finds little mention of the right of speech. One finds in its stead a sustained attempt to shore up
the rights of the states against what Madison feared was federal encroachment.
In the “Resolutions,” Madison wrote that the Virginia Assembly “views the powers of the federal government[] as resulting from the compact to which the states
are parties.”94 Not only does this statement complicate Sunstein’s effort to cast
Madison as a champion of free speech, but the statement also complicates the
received picture of Madison as a champion of constitutional democracy. Madison seemed to suggest in the “Resolutions” that the federal government was not
created by the people in whose name the Constitution was formally written, but
by the states.95 Later in the “Resolutions,” Madison affirmed that all of the powers belonging to the federal government were “granted by the said compact” of
the states.96 Because he characterized the Constitution as a compact among the
states—rather than an agreement by the people per se—Madison was able to assert that the states were the supreme sovereign, and therefore were not bound by
the decisions of the people acting as a national collective in Congress. Madison
argued that the “states who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty
bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining
within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to
them.”97 Lest there be any confusion, Madison stressed in the “Report” that
91

The historian Forrest McDonald usefully observed that by permitting truth as a defense and
requiring proof of malicious intent, the terms of the Sedition Act of 1789 “were more lenient
than those of the common-law offense of seditious libel that prevailed in every state.” FORREST
MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776–1876, at 41 (2000).
The objection raised by the Republicans in Congress “was not that it limited freedom of the
press but that it made seditious libel a federal offense.” Id. Professor McDonald added, “Jefferson’s and Madison’s responses to these acts, embodied in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, brought the issue of states’ rights back to center stage.” Id.
92 JAMES MADISON, VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AGAINST THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1798),
reprinted in MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 61, at 589, 589.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
96 MADISON, supra note 92, at 589.
97 Id. The Supreme Court begged to differ with Madison. In M’Culloch v. Maryland, Chief
Justice Marshall for the Court argued that, according to the Constitution, the people—not the
states—were the highest sovereign. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403–04 (1819).
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“[t]he [C]onstitution of the United States was formed by the sanction of the
states, given by each in its sovereign capacity.”98
Consonant language could be found in another part of Madison’s “Report”:
“The states then being the parties to the constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity, that there can be no tribunal above their
authority, to decide in the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated . . . .”99
Here was an early pronouncement made shortly after the birth of the republic, a pronouncement that unsettlingly anticipated the right of nullification and
secession that would be invoked by Southern states as a preface to the Civil
War.100 Madison summed up in the “Report” that “as parties to [the constitutional
compact], [the states] must themselves decide in the last resort, such questions
as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their interposition.”101 As Madison’s
emphasis on states’ rights suggested, the Father of the Constitution penned his
“Report” and “Resolutions” to shore up the rights of the states and—contrary to
the respective interpretations by Professor Sunstein and Justice Thomas—much
less so for the purpose of underwriting the argument that political speech deserved the highest protection.
Given his adamant defense of the right of a state to disobey federal laws that
the state judged to be unconstitutional, it was no wonder that Madison provoked
widespread rebuke from the very generation that Sunstein believes Madison
spoke for.102 One must remember the Sedition Act, whatever its faults, was
passed in Congress by a majority.103 Those who voted for the Act publicly defended that it was necessary to prevent the weak republic from disintegrating in
the face of French military invasion.104
But whether the Sedition Act was meritorious is beside the point. What matters is that it was a product of the founding generation. Recall Sunstein’s claim
that “[t]he view [adopted by the Supreme Court] that political speech belongs in
the top tier receives firm support from history.”105 Sunstein explained, “By this,
I refer first to the founding generation’s own theory of free expression.”106 Recall
too that by “founding generation” Sunstein referred essentially to Madison alone.
Madison’s criticism of the Sedition Act was the lone article of evidence that Sunstein had tendered. However, much of the “founding generation,” far from
98

MADISON, supra note 61, at 611.
Id.
100 See generally WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION
CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816–1836, at 291 (1965).
101 MADISON, supra note 61, at 611.
102 See STONE, supra note 69, at 45. (Consider that nearly every other state’s legislature condemned Madison’s “Resolution.”)
103 Id. at 43 (explaining that the Act was passed 44 for and 41 against).
104 Id. at 27.
105 SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 132.
106 Id.
99
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rallying around Madison’s arguments, censured them. So intolerable was Madison’s “Resolutions” that nearly every state other than Virginia passed its own
resolutions in 1799 condemning Madison’s “Resolutions” as illegal, dangerous,
or both.107 Condemnations of Madison’s “Resolutions” were expressed by

107

STONE, supra note 69, at 45.
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Delaware,108 Rhode Island,109 Massachusetts,110 Connecticut,111 New York,112
New Hampshire,113 Vermont,114 Maryland,115 and Pennsylvania.116 New Jersey
108

Delaware’s general assembly offered the following words in 1799:
Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the state of Delaware, . . . that they consider the resolutions from the state of Virginia as a very unjustifiable interference with the general
government and constituted authorities of the United States, and of dangerous tendency, and therefore not fit subject for the further consideration of the General Assembly.

Answers of the Several State Legislatures: State of Delaware, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 532, 532
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES].
109 Rhode Island harped on the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had never declared unconstitutional the Sedition Act. Therefore, Rhode Island construed Virginia’s Resolution, declaring
the act unconstitutional, to be an attempt to usurp the powers of the Supreme Court and thus a
violation of the principle of the separation of powers.
1. Resolved, That, in the opinion of this legislature, the second section of third article of the Constitution of the United States, in these words, to wit,—“The judicial power shall extend to all cases
arising under the laws of the United States,”—vests in the federal courts, exclusively, and in the
Supreme Court of the United States, ultimately, the authority of deciding on the constitutionality
of any act or law of the Congress of the United States.

Answers of the Several State Legislatures: State of Rhode Island, in THE DEBATES, supra note
108, at 533, 533. Rhode Island then addressed the Virginia Resolution:
2. Resolved, That for any state legislature to assume that authority would be—
1st. Blending together legislative and judicial powers;
2d. Hazarding an interruption of the peace of the states by civil discord, in case of a diversity of
opinions among the state legislatures; each state having, in that case, no resort for vindicating its
own opinion, but to the strength of its own arm; —
3d. Submitting most important questions of law, to less competent tribunals; and,
4th. An infraction of the Constitution of the United States, expressed in plain terms.

Id.
110

The Massachusetts general assembly wrote the longest rebuke of the Virginia Resolution.
Madison had claimed that the Constitution was created by the states and that, therefore, the
states could interpret the meaning of the Constitution and, where appropriate, nullify federal
laws. Massachusetts, however, argued that the Constitution was created by the people:
[T]he people, in that solemn compact which is declared to be the supreme law of the land, have
not constituted the state legislatures the judges of the acts or measures of the federal government,
but have confided to them the power of proposing such amendments of the Constitution as shall
appear to them necessary to the interests, or conformable to the wishes, of the people whom they
represent.

Answers of the Several State Legislatures: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in THE DEBATES,
supra note 108, at 533, 534. Massachusetts called out Virginia by name:
[S]hould the respectable state of Virginia persist in the assumption of the right to declare the acts
of the national government unconstitutional, and should she oppose successfully her force and will
to those of the nation, the Constitution would be reduced to a mere cipher, to the form and pageantry of authority, without the energy of power . . . .

Id.
111

Connecticut’s general assembly also condemned Madison’s Resolution:
That this Assembly views with deep regret, and explicitly disavows, the principles contained in
the aforesaid resolutions, and particularly the opposition to the “Alien and Sedition Acts”—acts
which the Constitution authorized, which the exigency of the country rendered necessary; which
the constituted authorities have enacted, and which merit the entire approbation of this Assembly.
They therefore, decidedly refuse to concur with the legislature of Virginia in promoting any of the
objects attempted in the aforesaid resolutions.
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Answers of the Several State Legislatures: State of Connecticut, in THE DEBATES, supra note
108, at 538.
112 New York’s senate also opposed Madison’s Resolution. New York’s senate affirmed the
importance of a strong national government:
[T]he people of the United States have established for themselves a free and independent national
government . . . it is essential to the existence of every government, that it have authority to defend
and preserve its constitutional powers inviolate, inasmuch as every infringement thereof tends to
its subversion.

Answers of the Several State Legislatures: State of New York, in Senate, in THE DEBATES,
supra note 108, at 537, 537. Having set this backdrop, the New York senate took aim at Virginia and Kentucky:
And whereas the Senate, not perceiving that the rights of the particular states have been violated,
nor any unconstitutional powers assumed by the general government, cannot forbear to express
the anxiety and regret with which they observe the inflammatory and pernicious sentiments and
doctrines which are contained in the resolutions of the legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky . . . .

Id. at 537–38. Madison was not the only Founding Father who discussed the First Amendment.
Massachusetts, in its critique of Madison’s Resolution, tried to clarify why Madison’s interpretation of the right of speech was flawed.
113 New Hampshire’s house of representatives wrote the following in response:
Resolved, That the Legislature of New Hampshire unequivocally express a firm resolution to
maintain and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of this state, against
every aggression, either foreign or domestic, and that they will support the government of the
United States in all measures warranted by the former . . . That if the Legislature of New Hampshire, for mere speculative purposes, were to express an opinion on the acts of the general government, commonly called “the Alien and Sedition Bills,” that opinion would unreservedly be, that
those acts are constitutional, and, in the present critical situation of our country, highly expedient.

Answers of the Several State Legislatures: State of New Hampshire, in the House of Representatives, in THE DEBATES, supra note 108, at 538, 539.
114 Vermont’s house of representatives passed the following resolution:
Resolved, That the General Assembly of the state of Vermont do highly disapprove of the resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia, as being unconstitutional in their nature, and dangerous
in their tendency. It belongs not to state legislatures to decide on the constitutionality of laws made
by the general government; this power being exclusively vested in the judiciary courts of the Union. That his excellency, the governor, be requested to transmit a copy of this resolution to the
executive of Virginia, to be communicated to the General Assembly of that state: And that the
same be sent to the governor and council for their concurrence.

Answers of the Several State Legislatures: State of Vermont, in the House of Representatives,
in THE DEBATES, supra note 108, at 539, 539.
115 Maryland’s House of Delegates declared:
Resolved, That the general assembly of Maryland highly disapprove of the sentiments and opinions contained in the resolutions of the legislature of Virginia, inasmuch as they contain the unwarrantable doctrine of the competency of a state government, by a legislative act, to declare an
act of the federal government unconstitutional and void, and as they contain a request for our cooperation with them in obtaining a repeal of laws, which, at this crisis, we believe are wise and
politic.

Frank M. Anderson, Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions (pt. 2),
5 AM. HIST. REV. 225, 248 (1900) (quoting Report of the Votes and Proceedings of the House
of Delegates of the State of Maryland at November Session, 1798).
116 The Pennsylvania House of Representatives adopted this resolution:
Resolved, That as it is the opinion of this House that the principles contained in the resolutions of
the Legislature of Virginia, relative to certain measures of the general government, are calculated
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did not pass a formal resolution but its legislature in 1799 spoke out against Madison’s “Resolution.”117 There were ten states, then, out of thirteen, that expressed
disapproval for Madison’s resolution.118 To be sure, a substantial number of
Americans supported Madison’s “Resolutions.” That they did scarcely mitigates
the irony in Professor Sunstein having attributed to Madison the voice of the
“founding generation” when, in reality, Madison’s was, by a formal measure, the
minority view at the time it was publicly expressed.
B. The Argument from Self-Government
Looking to the views of the Founding Fathers has not been the only means
that scholars have pursued in bracing the claim that political speech deserves the
highest protection. Scholars have also turned to the political theory of self-government.119 The scholar who is associated most directly with the political theory
of self-government is Alexander Meiklejohn. Meiklejohn was president of Amherst College from 1913 to 1923 and a prominent public intellectual in his day.120
In Meiklejohn’s view, “[t]he First Amendment does not protect a ‘freedom to
speak.’ ”121 Instead, “[i]t protects the freedom of those activities of thought and
communication by which we ‘govern.’ ”122 By inserting the word govern, Meiklejohn implied that the main task of the First Amendment was to protect political speech. His words were published in an article from 1961, but by 1948 Meiklejohn had developed the political theory animating them.123 The culmination
of his arguments was his landmark book, Free Speech and Its Relation to SelfGovernment.124 There, he developed the thesis that Americans had created a constitutional democracy where all political authority accrued from the people.125
Under such a system, “[t]here is only one group—the self-governing people”
and, accordingly, “[r]ulers and ruled are the same individuals.”126 In sum, for
to excite unwarrantable discontents, and to destroy the very existence of our government, they
ought to be, and are hereby, rejected.

Id. (quoting 4 H.R JOURNAL 289 (Pa. 1799)).
117 The New Jersey Resolution, unlike the resolutions by the other states, was not formally
delivered to Congress, and therefore, a record of it does not exist. See Frank M. Anderson,
Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions (pt. 1), 5 AM. HIST. REV. 45,
52 (1899).
118 See supra notes 108–17 and accompanying text.
119 Sunstein’s reading of Madison, while in part originalist, is also an effort to develop what
Sunstein sees as the merits of Madison’s theory of self-government. See SUNSTEIN, supra note
9, at xvi.
120 Biddy Martin, President, Amherst Coll., 2017 Convocation Address (Sept. 24, 2017),
https://www.amherst.edu/amherst-story/today/amherst-videos/convocation-2017
[https://perma.cc/FN69-58DW].
121 Meiklejohn, supra note 27, at 255.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 246 n.4.
124 See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 27.
125 Id. at 6.
126 Id.
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Meiklejohn, “[w]e, the People, are our own masters, our own subjects.”127 Therefore, he argued that the people must be permitted to discuss political matters with
each other.128 It was Meiklejohn’s hope that with the benefit of such discussion,
the people would make meaningful political choices as self-governing beings.129
Meiklejohn’s arguments resonated with those of Justice Brennan in one of
the most important cases in the history of the First Amendment: New York Times
v. Sullivan.130 Decided in 1964, the case involved an advertisement that was published by the Times.131 The Court noted, however, that the substance of the “advertisement” could more properly be characterized as political speech.132 A
group of civil rights activists who supported Martin Luther King, Jr. asserted in
the advertisement that the local police in Montgomery, Alabama, had harassed,
abused, and unlawfully detained King and the activists.133 L. B. Sullivan was
Montgomery’s commissioner and he was responsible for the police.134 Therefore, while Sullivan was not named, the reader of the advertisement could reasonably infer that Sullivan had ordered the police to attack King and his supporters. In fact, Sullivan argued at trial that the advertisement left no doubt that the
activists were pointing to him as the culpable party.135 Sullivan accordingly sued
the Times for libel.136 The jury awarded him $500,000, an incredible sum back
in 1964, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.137
To Sullivan’s dismay, the Supreme Court in New York Times introduced a
radical legal concept called the actual malice test that would usher unprecedented
protection for political speech, including speech that was otherwise defamatory.138 Under the traditional law of defamation, a plaintiff had to show that a
statement purporting to be fact was published to a third party and that the false
statement was made at least negligently and had damaged the plaintiff’s reputation.139 No category of speech—including political speech—was excepted from
the traditional law of defamation. In New York Times, however, the Court invented the actual malice test for the purpose of exempting political speech from
the tort of defamation.140 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan introduced the
127

Id.
Id. at 22–27.
129 Id.
130 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
131 Id. at 256.
132 Id. at 266.
133 Id. at 257–58.
134 Id. at 256 (“[Sullivan] testified that he was ‘Commissioner of Public Affairs and the duties
are supervision of the Police Department . . . .’ ”).
135 Brief for Respondent at 25, N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. 254 (No. 39) 1963 WL 105892.
136 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
137 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 28, 52 (Ala. 1962).
138 See Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 539–40
(1988) (discussing the effects of the actual malice test on common law libel).
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
140 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 267–68.
128
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actual malice test as an additional element that a plaintiff had to prove if he were
a public official and the statement that was said about him concerned his official
conduct.141 The actual malice test thus applied to a certain variety of political
speech because it did not apply to defamatory statements about a private person
acting in her private capacity. Under the actual malice test, the plaintiff had to
prove that the defamatory statement was made “with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”142 The New York Times
Court thus endeavored to provide special protection for political speech that was
nevertheless defamatory.
Justice Brennan for the New York Times Court argued that there was precedent for the actual malice test. He pointed to a 1908 Kansas case, Coleman v.
MacLennan, in which the state attorney general, who was running for reelection,
sued a newspaper for publishing libel in an article that discussed the candidate’s
official conduct.143 Justice Brennan approvingly quoted the jury instructions by
the trial judge in Coleman, who had instructed the jury as follows:
[W]here an article is published . . . for the sole purpose of giving what the defendant believes to be truthful information concerning a candidate for public office
and for the purpose of enabling such voters to cast their ballot more intelligently, . . . in such a case the burden is on the plaintiff to show actual malice in
the publication of the article.144

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, and Justice
Brennan quoted from the former as well: “[I]t is of the utmost consequence that
the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their
suffrages.”145 By focusing on the importance of public deliberation of political
affairs, these words reverberated Meiklejohn’s argument from self-government.
While the Kansas Supreme Court’s ruling did not, strictly speaking, serve as
formal precedent for the U.S. Supreme Court, the ruling did provide a guidepost
for what was possible. The Supreme Court in New York Times followed that
guidepost and extended protection for political speech that was otherwise defamatory and hence unprotected.146 At the same time, Justice Brennan emphasized
that there also existed independent reasons rooted in the logic of self-government
for why the actual malice test was justified.147 He explained that the actual malice
test formulated in New York Times was underwritten by “[t]he general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First
Amendment [and] has long been settled by our decisions.”148 The reference to
“public questions” implied that Justice Brennan had in mind topics addressed by
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
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political speech. Support for this inference was supplied by a statement that Justice Brenan quoted in New York Times from his own majority opinion in Roth v.
United States: “The constitutional safeguard, we have said, ‘was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’ ”149 In the next sentence, Justice Brennan
quoted from Stromberg v. California: “The maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”150 Like Professor Meiklejohn, Justice Brennan seemed to
adopt the view that political speech should be afforded the highest protection
because it was necessary for a people who are self-governing to exercise their
rights to change their laws and their government.
1. The Logical Problem
The argument advanced by Meiklejohn and Justice Brennan for the priority
of political speech is hobbled by a subversive paradox. Meiklejohn and Justice
Brennan were eager to grant the highest protection to political speech based on
the principle that the people should be permitted to exercise their rights in a constitutional democracy to create, alter, or abolish laws.151 According to this view,
political speech is valuable because it helps people to form ideas and opinions
about what kinds of laws to pass. Therefore, for Meiklejohn and Justice Brennan,
laws that abridge political speech are presumptively unconstitutional.
This position adopted by Meiklejohn and Justice Brennan exists, however,
in corrosive tension with the logic that they believe underwrites said position. To
understand why, it is vital to recognize that the argument from self-government
proposed by Meiklejohn and Justice Brennan is not in essence an argument for
political speech; at its heart, theirs is not an argument about speech at all. Their
arguments instead should properly be understood as arguments for the right of
the people to participate in self-government. Under the formulation by Meiklejohn and Justice Brennan, the heightened protection enjoyed by political
speech is simply derivative of this larger theory of democracy. Meiklejohn and
Justice Brennan claimed that the purpose of protecting political speech was to
empower the people to make their own political decisions as self-governing beings.152 But the dedication to self-government, rather than shielding political
speech with the highest protection, could also restrict it.
Suppose “the people”—the democratic collective whom Meiklejohn and
Justice Brennan insisted are the highest sovereign—were exposed to a rich diversity of ideas and opinions concerning a given issue, exactly the sort of
149
150
151
152
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diversity of political speech idealized by Meiklejohn and Justice Brennan. Suppose further that the people weighed the competing arguments provided by this
diversity, and, after much reflection, decided to urge their elected representatives
to pass a law that abridged political speech, which the people feared was dangerous to stable government. Acting on the wishes of the people, the representatives,
let us stipulate, enacted such a law. The argument from self-government advanced by Meiklejohn and Justice Brennan would require that both men presumptively accept the decision of the people regardless of how either of them
feels about the moral substance of the decision. To do otherwise would be to
court a logical contradiction. As Meiklejohn himself admitted, “No plan of action
shall be outlawed because someone in control thinks it unwise, unfair, un-American.”153
Seen from this perspective, the 1798 Sedition Act, the law condemned by
James Madison as a threat to self-government, was not necessarily a transgression from the principle of self-government extolled by Meiklejohn and Justice
Brennan. The Act was arguably an instantiation of it. For in enacting the Sedition
Act, federal officials, working on behalf of their constituents, had engaged in and
been exposed to political speech. The officials had deliberated the speech and
then, for good or ill, decided that statements that were critical of the federal government should be prohibited, at least for the time being, for the sake of national
security.154 Considered in this light, the Sedition Act, even as it stifled political
speech, was itself the product of political speech. In short, the Sedition Act was
a collective assertion by a people who subscribed to the argument from self-government. The same thing may be said of the resolutions passed by ten of the
thirteen states that were extant in 1799. Passionately supportive of the Sedition
Act, these resolutions were the expressions of a people who, after having deliberated competing opinions, had decided that speech critical of the national government should not be suffered at an exceptionally precarious time for the United
States. As the example of the Sedition Act of 1798 suggested, the protection for
political speech could, ironically, cause people to voice and to deliberate political
opinions that, in turn, could cause the same people to pass laws that severely
restrict political speech. Rather than enabling greater freedom for political
speech, as Justice Brennan and Meiklejohn seem to hope, the justification from
self-government can bring together circumstances that can result in the constriction of political speech.
Something similar may be said of the decision by the jury, the trial court,
and the Alabama Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan. For a plausible
argument may be made that these decisions are the products of deliberation by
the people of Alabama. The jury heard the arguments—the political speech, in
other words—delivered in court by the Times and by Sullivan. The jury deliberated the competing arguments. Afterwards, the jury awarded Sullivan $500,000
153
154
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based on his claim that he had been libeled by the Times.155 As described, the
jury behaved as the quintessential democratic body; it weighed the merits of
competing political speech for purposes of adjudication.156 The trial judge heard
the jury’s verdict, a form of political speech in its own right. The trial judge then
deliberated whether he should permit the verdict to stand, which he eventually
did.157 The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently reviewed the arguments by
Sullivan and the Times and made the decision to let the verdict stand.158 The
Alabama Supreme Court, like the jury who made the initial decision, had
weighed the myriad instances of political speech presented in the case—including the arguments by plaintiff, the arguments by defendant, and the Times’s advertisement itself—and then had rendered its decision to uphold the jury’s verdict. All three deliberative bodies (the jury, the trial court, and the Alabama
Supreme Court) therefore did exactly what they were expected to do in terms of
the argument from self-government advanced by Justice Brennan in New York
Times.
Justice Brennan, however, introduced the actual malice test for the purpose
of overturning the decisions by each of these deliberative bodies even though
each of them, in theory, had performed in accord with the principle of self-government touted by Justice Brennan himself. He had formulated the actual malice
test in order to enhance opportunities for the people alluded to in the Constitution’s Preamble to make their own political decisions, but the upshot of the actual
malice test was to empower judges at the expense of the people. This ironic consequence manifested itself in the following manner: The Court held in New York
Times that if the plaintiff were required to prove that the speaker acted with actual
malice, the plaintiff had to satisfy the evidential standard of clear and convincing
proof.159 The New York Times Court permitted the jury to make the initial decision regarding whether the plaintiff met this standard of proof. However, the New
York Times Court also held that the judge could review the jury’s decision.160
Under the holding in New York Times, the judge thus enjoyed the right to overturn the jury’s verdict.161 But the Court in New York Times never explained how
155

N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 264 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Debra
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315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942) (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).
157 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 51 (Ala. 1962) (“All in all we do not feel
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by its judgment on the motion for a new trial . . . .”).
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the judge should make this determination, opting only to say that actual malice
should be proved with “convincing clarity.”162 This ambiguity has provided the
judge a degree of control over the jury’s decision about whether plaintiff has
proven actual malice. By bestowing the trial judge the power to overturn the
jury’s determination that plaintiff had met the standard of clear and convincing
evidence, the Court in New York Times strayed from the traditional rule that jury
determinations were not to be set aside unless they were clearly erroneous.163
On a related note, Justice Brennan for the Court in New York Times made in
his instant case what was a potentially factual determination about the actual
malice test that was best left to the jury. The jury in New York Times made the
inference that while the Times did not refer to Sullivan by name, a reasonable
person could infer as much.164 Justice Brennan for the Court, however, overturned the jury’s conclusion and argued that the political advertisement in the
Times referred only to the local government in Montgomery.165 To do otherwise,
he warned, would amount to permitting seditious libel.166 “The present proposition,” Justice Brennan insisted, “would sidestep this obstacle by transmuting criticism of government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal
criticism, and hence potential libel, of the officials of whom the government is
composed.”167 In a case that has been celebrated as a colossal victory for the right
of self-government, Justice Brennan’s opinion in New York Times contained
structural features that could have the effect of thwarting the will of the people,
the very thing that the argument from self-government was trying to facilitate.
Thus far, this Article has addressed the issue of whether political speech deserves the highest protection. This Article has suggested that efforts to justify
such a lofty position for political speech have proved unsatisfactory. Even if one
were to accept the premise that political speech did deserve heightened protection, there is another issue that must be addressed: What counts as “political”
speech? The Supreme Court has operated from the assumption that “political”
speech is a distinct category. The next Part challenges that assumption as untenable in practice.
II. DEFINING “POLITICAL” SPEECH IS TOO DIFFICULT
Even if we accepted the proposition that political speech deserved the highest protection, there is a basic problem concerning how one should define “political” speech. As Professor Sunstein himself confesses, “the distinction
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between the political and the nonpolitical may be extremely difficult to draw.”168
The Supreme Court has tacitly acknowledged this difficulty. Notwithstanding its
repeated insistence that “[p]olitical speech . . . is ‘at the core of what the First
Amendment is designed to protect,’ ”169 the Court has never clarified what exactly it means by “political speech.”
A. Obscenity, Literary Speech, and Scientific Speech
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Miller v. California decided that obscenity
should not receive any First Amendment protection.170 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Burger explained that expression was obscene if it appealed “to the
prurient interest in sex, which portray[s] sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way, and which, taken as a whole, do[es] not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”171 Chief Justice Burger’s definition of obscenity did not
exempt political speech alone. Speech that contained serious literary, artistic, or
scientific content was also exempted from obscenity. However, when one examines Chief Justice Burger’s rationale for exempting these nonpolitical categories
from obscenity, one discovers that he had little to say about them. Instead, he
harped on the importance of political speech, as if literary, artistic, and scientific
speech could be exempted from obscenity only to the extent that they bore similarities to political speech. Responding to the dissenting opinion, which accused
his majority opinion of “repression,” Chief Justice Burger explained: “[I]n our
view, to equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with
commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of
the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom.”172
In the aforementioned remark, Chief Justice Burger evinced a preoccupation
with the task of distinguishing political speech from obscenity, a task that would
seem to hinge on the existence of objective criteria. Yet the method that he selected to distinguish political speech from obscenity was in part based on a normative assumption. One could go so far as to say that his attempt at clarification
amounted to a celebration of political speech and a rebuke of obscenity. According to Chief Justice Burger, the First Amendment was not designed to remain
neutral about speech.173 It was meant to promote “political debate,” not to titillate
as obscenity was wont to do.174 For Chief Justice Burger, the First Amendment
was created to serve “high purposes,” not to aid the “commercial exploitation of
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obscene material.”175 Indeed, he insisted that the First Amendment was intertwined with the overtly political cause of “the historic struggle for freedom,” a
cause that was presumptively incongruous with the lewd and embarrassing aims
of obscenity.176
The Chief Justice, however, did insert one potentially instructive distinction
between political speech and obscenity. He implied that obscenity was not political speech because obscenity could not contribute to “the free and robust exchange of ideas” and obscenity could not contribute to “political debate.”177 This
purported distinction is not useful, however. Despite the arguments of Chief Justice Burger, the distinction between political speech and obscenity was less turgid than turbid. For speech that is “obscene” could also contribute to the “interchange of ideas” and even “bring about political and social changes.”178 The
Miller Court defined as “obscene” speech that was “patently offensive” and “prurient,” as these terms were interpreted by the local standards of a jury.179 But
speech that is patently offensive and prurient can have a powerful effect on shaping one’s political worldview.
Consider the following hypothetical. Joseph is a forty-year-old single resident of Albuquerque who works at the copy center at the University of New
Mexico. He has never given any sustained thought to the topic of polygamy.
However, out of curiosity, Joseph googled and retrieved an “obscene” video on
the internet that portrayed sexual intercourse in a manner that glorified polygamy. There was no mention in the obscene video of laws, government, public
policy, politicians, or anything else resembling politics in a conventional sense.
Nevertheless, the video could be seen as brimming with political meaning. For
polygamy is a crime,180 and the video represented the crime in a way that the
erotic pleasures associated with it could be deeply attractive to some viewers.
From a certain angle, the obscene video amounted to the same “free and robust
exchange of ideas” that Chief Justice Burger attributed to political speech.
Suppose that Joseph watched this obscene video several times. He gradually
arrived at the conclusion that the sexual rewards of polygamy outweighed whatever social taboos it harbored. Joseph then began to post on social media and
other online venues that he believed laws against polygamy were paternalistic
and misguided. Some readers, let us suppose, spiritedly criticized his position.
Joseph deliberated the content of their criticisms and, after some weeks, developed more considered arguments. He insisted, for example, that his arguments
for polygamy were meant to apply only to consenting adults and never to minors,
175
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and that any spouse in the polygamous marriage retained the right of divorce.
Joseph also published online a relatively sophisticated argument that polygamy
was a victimless “crime” and therefore should be permitted. Notice what Joseph
was doing. After watching content that the Court would deem obscene, he now
participated in the very thing that made political speech so worthy of protection
for Chief Justice Burger in Miller: the “interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.”181 Material that was
formally obscene has caused Joseph to reimagine what his world could look like
in political terms. Allegedly obscene material came to deeply ingrain his political
ideas.
The same scenario can play out under different circumstances. Consider the
case of Ashley, a married thirty-five-year-old woman who works at her family’s
flower shop in Bowling Green, Kentucky. She has never thought seriously about
issues related to feminism. Out of curiosity, she searched for pornography on the
internet. There, Ashley stumbled upon the same obscene video seen by Joseph.
Ashley was appalled by what seemed to her a celebratory depiction of unfiltered
misogyny. Rather than interpreting the video as an endorsement for adult autonomy, as Joseph had done, Ashley saw it as an attempt by men to portray women
as objects of sexual exploitation. Whatever ostensive autonomy the men enjoyed
in the video was at the expense of the women who were exploited, Ashley concluded. In particular, she became disgusted, not in the aesthetic sense because
the content was “obscene,” but in the moral sense because the video appeared to
her to represent the worldview that one man was entitled to unapologetically exploit a group of young women who have been brainwashed to fawn over him
sexually.
After watching the video, Ashley became livid. Her anger grew when she
saw how often this video had been streamed and, presumably, enjoyed by men.
Her rage galvanized Ashley to become politicized for the first time in her life.
Ashley attended conferences organized by the Gender and Women’s Studies Program at nearby Western Kentucky University, and at the public library, she
checked out books by feminist scholars. Eventually, Ashley joined a group in
Bowling Green that aspired to strengthen punishment for sexual assaults against
women. While Ashley’s preferred form of political action differed from Joseph’s, their respective outcomes demonstrate that the distinction between “obscenity” and “political” speech is extremely porous. Under the Supreme Court’s
formulation, the content, if obscene, would be deemed as lacking “serious” political value. Yet the hypotheticals involving Joseph and Ashley suggest that it
was the “obscene” video that powerfully inspired their respective political beliefs
and spurred them to participate in political discourse with others.
As such, perhaps it is more accurate to propose that the distinction between
“political” speech and “obscenity” is not only porous, but mutually constitutive.
Political speech cannot exist in a vacuum. People do not learn about “politics”
181
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(however it is defined) from reading and talking about “politics” alone. Chief
Justice Burger in Miller tries to ennoble political speech as consistent with “high
purposes in the struggle for freedom” while disparaging obscenity by associating
it with “commercial exploitation.”182 But as suggested by the hypotheticals involving Joseph and Ashley, it was obscenity that stimulated how each person
thought about politics. Political speech cannot become “free and robust,” as
Chief Justice Burger in Miller wished for it, unless people are permitted wide
discretion to peruse a host of different categories of speech, including speech that
is unprotected.183 It is certainly possible that neither Joseph nor Ashley would
have formed their political opinions about gender but for having seen the obscene
video.
There appears, indeed, to be a backward logic to the Court’s definition of
political speech in relation to other categories of speech. In Miller, the Court held
that material that was otherwise patently offensive and prurient was exempted
from obscenity if the speech contained serious “literary,” “artistic,” “scientific,”
and “political” value.184 Yet the insistence that these sundry categories differ
from political speech is problematic. As shown in the examples of Joseph and
Ashley, “obscene” speech could be in theory reasonably interpreted as “political”
speech, and, to the extent there are differences between the two, the former could
crucially inform the latter. The same could be said for the other categories of
speech in relation to political speech. Literary speech, for example—speech
found in novels, short stories, poems, and memoirs—could form the basis of a
person’s political ideas.
Leo Tolstoy’s short story The Death of Ivan Ilyich can be enlisted as an example for how a literary work can also function as political speech.185 Ivan Ilyich
is a fictionalized account of a successful Russian attorney in the late nineteenth
century who, after a life of striving and ambition, learns, as he is dying over the
course of several months, how spiritually and morally pointless his life has
been.186 It is only when he is very near death that he experiences the rapture of
something akin to religious epiphany.187 Tolstoy’s story, like any excellent work
of fiction, can serve as a commentary about more than one thing, and it is not
necessary for the reader to interpret Ivan Ilyich as a story with a political theme.
The story can be read as such too, however. Ivan ultimately obtained a job as a
magistrate on the Court of Justice, nineteenth-century Russia’s version of the
U.S. Supreme Court.188 In lieu of pondering issues of justice and the moral consequences of his decisions, Ivan “completely exclud[ed] his personal opinion of
182
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the matter, while above all observing every prescribed formality.”189 Ivan, like
all of the magistrates and lawyers in his upper-class circle, lived a morally shallow life, and his main obsession was the augmentation of his social status.190
They never dwelt on whether they should be mindful of their ethical obligations
to the vulnerable, over whom they had godlike powers, or how their professional
lives were devoid of philosophic purpose.191 Therefore, Tolstoy’s short story
could be read as a political commentary that calls attention to the need to reform
the legal profession. At the least, Tolstoy’s story could inspire reflection by the
reader about various political topics including whether laws should be passed to
compel attorneys to provide pro bono assistance to indigents, and whether lawyers should be required to attend educational forums to address how they can use
their legal training to benefit society as a whole.
The category of “scientific” speech could also bleed into the category of
“political” speech. One noteworthy example is how speech rooted in empirical
evidence was employed in 1975 by the American Psychological Association
(APA) to refute the assumption that homosexuality is a manifestation of mental
illness.192 The conclusions made by the APA, while empirically based, can be
seen as having significant political substance. For the logical upshot of the APA’s
speech is that gay persons should not be treated as second-class citizens marked
by stigma.193 While it is impossible to measure with certainty the degree to which
the APA’s clinical pronouncements directly affected political discourse, it is
worth reflecting on the difference in tone adopted by Supreme Court Justices
over time. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court upheld in 1986 a Georgia law that
189
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forbade “sodomy.”194 Michael Hardwick, a gay man, had been charged with violating the law, although the prosecutor declined to bring charges.195 Writing for
the Court, Justice White argued that there was no “fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy.”196 Chief Justice Burger, concurring, delivered a severe moral condemnation of what he dubbed “[h]omosexual sodomy.”197 He announced that homosexual sodomy was, according to the
British jurist William Blackstone, “the infamous crime against nature” as an offense of “ ‘deeper malignity’ than rape, a heinous act ‘the very mention of which
is a disgrace to human nature,’ and ‘a crime not fit to be named.’ ”198 To accept
that the right to participate in homosexual sodomy is fundamental, Chief Justice
Burger warned, “would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”199
Such language was antithetical, if not hostile, to the APA’s conclusion that
homosexuality was not a disease or a mental disorder. The APA’s conclusions
were expounded in the amicus brief that the APA had filed in Bowers.200 Against
the explicitly moral rhetoric of Chief Justice Burger, the APA urged the Court to
“consider scientific, demographic, and clinical information concerning the intimate conduct made criminal by the statute.”201 The APA added, “Despite some
people’s moral or theological objections to oral or anal sex, this conduct is extremely common among married and unmarried heterosexuals and homosexuals.”202 Not only was the prohibited conduct pervasive, the APA reassured that
the conduct was psychologically healthy:
Clinical research also indicates that the freedom to engage in such conduct is important to the psychological health of individuals and of their most intimate and
profound relationships. Like the decision whether to use contraceptives, the decision with whom and whether one will engage in these types of nonprocreative
sexual conduct is among “the most private and sensitive” of decisions, concerning
“the most intimate of human activities and relationships.”203

In conclusion, the APA posited in its brief that “[b]ecause neither homosexuality nor the prohibited sexual conduct is pathological in and of itself, preventing the development of homosexuality and deterring the prohibited conduct cannot be defended as mental health goals, even if the statute had such effects (which
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it does not).”204 According to the APA, then, homosexuality was not a psychological aberration that required medical treatment.
Reflect on what the APA was doing in relation to Chief Justice Burger’s
assertions in Bowers. The Chief Justice had framed the issue as one that was far
removed from science. For him, the issue in Bowers was squarely rooted in morality. “Homosexual sodomy” was for him “the infamous crime against nature”
and contrary to a “millennia of moral teaching.”205 The APA brief, on the other
hand, recast the issue as a scientific one about mental health. As a formal matter,
the brief did not have a political agenda. The brief merely sought to illuminate
scientific knowledge that had been procured by experts through the process of
investigation and analysis. But the “scientific” speech by the APA could be read,
in its fashion, as a form of political speech as well. By presenting itself as a better
source of epistemic authority than the traditional moralism of Blackstone invoked by Chief Justice Burger, the APA, in effect, had rendered a political opinion about what constitutes the best evidential basis for the Court’s decision.
Bowers, decided in 1986, would be overturned by Lawrence v. Texas in
2003.206 In Lawrence, the Court struck down a Texas law that forbade two persons of the same gender from engaging in “deviate sexual intercourse.”207 Like
it did in Bowers, the APA filed an amicus brief.208 The amicus brief read, “Decades of research and clinical experience have led all mainstream mental health
organizations in this country to the conclusion that homosexuality is a normal
form of human sexuality.”209 “Research has also found no inherent association,”
the APA reiterated, “between homosexuality and psychopathology.”210 The APA
directly addressed the claims by Texas: “Because Texas does not attempt to punish consensual, private sexual conduct between adults of different sexes,
[Texas’s law] must rest on the perception that intimate sexual activity warrants
suppression when, but only when, it occurs between persons of the same sex.”211
However, the APA cautioned that “[s]cientific research and the experience of the
mental health professions do not support that position.”212 “To the contrary,”
continued the APA, “the sexual orientation known as homosexuality . . . is a
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Id. at 3.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring).
206 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
207 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003), invalidated by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (“A
person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual
of the same sex.”); id. § 21.01(1) (“Deviate sexual intercourse [is] any contact between any
part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or the penetration
of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.”).
208 Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Psych. Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioners, Lawrence, 539
U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152338.
209 Id. at 1.
210 Id. at 2.
211 Id. at 4.
212 Id.
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normal variant of human sexual expression.”213 Further, the APA added, “[s]exual orientation is . . . integrally linked to the close bonds that human beings form
with others to meet their personal needs for love, attachment, and intimacy.”214
“These bonds,” the APA explained, “also encompass nonsexual physical affection between partners, shared goals and values, mutual support, and ongoing
commitment.”215
The APA offered its statements as scientific conclusions, not as political
speech in a conventional sense. But their substance reverberated with Justice
Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Lawrence. Justice Kennedy in Lawrence, like the
APA in its amicus brief, affirmed that homosexuality was not a disorder or a
disease.216 He thus announced, “When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”217 Suggestively, these words seem to echo
those in the APA’s amicus brief that homosexual intimacy is a normal, healthy
part of a mutually affectionate relationship. While conclusive evidence is unavailable, the similarity between the words of Justice Kennedy and the APA imply
that “scientific” speech can animate the substance of “political” speech.
The APA’s statement about homosexuality as neither a disease nor a disorder was issued in 1973, but today, there also exist prominent examples of scientific speech that can also arguably qualify as political speech or contribute meaningfully to the ideas that inform the same. During the worldwide pandemic that
has ravaged the world at the time of this writing, scientific reports have come to
assume the character of political speech. An outwardly scientific question about
where COVID-19 originated—in a wet market in Wuhan (as President Trump
claimed218) or by American soldiers visiting China (as President Xi
claimed219)—is a decidedly political issue. Other aspects of COVID-19 have become a matter of politics, and hence discussions about them can be seen as examples of political speech. The case of Dr. Anthony Fauci is illustrative. He is
the Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NAID).
Having served in both Republican and Democratic administrations, he “oversees
213

Id.
Id.
215 Id. at 5.
216 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
217 Id. Even if the APA’s speech were “purely” clinical in substance, the speech could very
well have prompted deliberation about explicitly political issues such as the constitutionality
of gay marriage and whether the ban against gays in the military was justified.
218 Mannvi Singh et al., Trump Claims to Have Evidence Coronavirus Started in Chinese Lab
but Offers No Details, GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2020, 11:51 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2020/apr/30/donald-trump-coronavirus-chinese-lab-claim [https://perma.cc/3BCWVG33].
219 Gabriel Crossley, China Government Spokesman Says U.S. Military May Have Brought
Virus to China, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2020, 2:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-china-usa/china-government-spokesman-says-u-s-military-may-havebrought-virus-to-china-idUSKBN20Z196 [https://perma.cc/83ZN-U6VS].
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an extensive research portfolio of basic and applied research to prevent, diagnose, and treat established infectious diseases.”220 On July 17, 2020, the New
York Times described Fauci as follows: “ ‘You can trust respected medical authorities,’ Dr. Fauci said this week in a virtual forum at Georgetown University,
almost plaintively at times. ‘I believe I’m one of them, so I think you can trust
me.’ ”221
According to the Times, Fauci “checked all the right boxes of a particular
kind of Washington icon who could ‘transcend politics.’ ” 222 The Times excerpted a testimonial:
“I have known Tony a long time, and I’ve never heard him identify himself as a
Democrat or Republican,” said Dr. Margaret A. Hamburg, a former director of
the Food and Drug Administration and a onetime assistant to Dr. Fauci. “He has
always taken great pride in that he has continued to run a lab and see patients.”223

In this nonpartisan role, Fauci has made recommendations about best practices for health in light of the available scientific evidence.224 He testified before
Congress on May 12, 2020, that states must be cautious about opening restaurants, bars, and the like too quickly.225 Fauci was adamant that opening schools
was dangerous: “I think we better be careful, if we are not cavalier, in thinking
that children are completely immune to the deleterious effects.”226
President Trump dismissed Fauci’s warnings,227 and thereby illustrated how
outwardly scientific speech could be seen as possessing the properties of political
speech. The President responded, “I was surprised by his answer.”228 Fauci, President Trump mocked, “wants to play all sides of the equation.”229 The President
thus insinuated that the doctor was interested in protecting his own reputation,
not in providing scientific advice.230 The President then bragged that the economy next year would be “phenomenal.”231 With this latter comment, President
Trump implied that Fauci’s conclusion about science was both scientifically
220

Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., NIAID Director, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS
DISEASES, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/director [https://perma.cc/5ZHP-G92L].
221 Mark Leibovich, Treacherous Times for Dr. Fauci in the Sacred Cow Business, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/17/us/fauci-trump.html [https://pe
rma.cc/YV2L-48F2].
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, At Senate Hearing, Government Experts Paint Bleak Picture of the
Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/12/us/politics/co
ronavirus-dr-fauci-robert-redfield.html [https://perma.cc/55YA-M5V7].
225 Id.
226 Katie Rogers, Trump Pointedly Criticizes Fauci for His Testimony to Congress, N.Y.
TIMES (June 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/13/us/politics/fauci-trump-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/B6XS-YN73].
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inaccurate and posed a threat to the economy. As the Times put it, “Dr. Fauci has
increasingly become a target of critics who see him as undermining the president’s efforts to open up the country and restore the economy and as exaggerating the effects of the pandemic.”232 While lacking Fauci’s scientific training, the
President, a former reality-TV actor, spun the scientific data to benefit his bid for
reelection. In his characteristically ungrammatical style, the President asserted:
“[While COVID-19 could hurt those with preexisting ailments] with the young
children, I mean, and students, it is really just take a look at the statistics, it is
pretty amazing.”233 Just as President Trump had accused Fauci of using speech
about science for political ends, here was the President seemingly doing the same
thing. In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court had maintained that there existed boundaries between “scientific” speech and “political” speech, but the President’s statements, as well as Fauci’s, suggest that these boundaries are tenuous,
and indeed, that “scientific” speech and “political” speech can work to define
each other’s meaning.
This mutually constitutive quality also attends the relationship between commercial speech and political speech, a proposition to which the Article will turn
next.
B. Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court did not even afford First Amendment protection for
commercial speech until 1976.234 Even after the Court decided to protect it, commercial speech was denied protection if it proposed an illegal transaction or was
misleading.235 By contrast, the Court has protected political speech even if it proposed an illegal transaction or was misleading, as long as the speech did not
amount to a clear and present danger.236 Such unequal treatment suggests that
there are fundamental differences between the two categories of speech. Upon
closer review, however, the purported differences seem questionable.
This argument can be unpacked by starting with Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.237 In Virginia Pharmacy, the
Supreme Court held for the first time that commercial speech deserved First
Amendment protection.238 Virginia’s State Board of Pharmacy passed a law stating that a pharmacist was guilty of “unprofessional conduct” if he “publishes,
advertises or promotes . . . any amount . . . for any drugs which may be
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Id.
234 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) (“In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of course
do not hold that it can never be regulated in any way.”).
235 Id. at 770–71.
236 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
237 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
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dispensed only by prescription.”239 The State Board argued that such a law was
necessary to preserve the integrity of the pharmacy profession.240 But an unwelcome effect of the law was to suppress information about the differences in drug
prices, which, the Court noted, could be as high as 650% in Virginia, depending
on the pharmacy.241 The Court struck down Virginia’s law as a violation of the
First Amendment.242 To do so, the Court had to break with precedent and declare
that commercial speech deserved protection.
The justification employed by the Court stressed that commercial speech
was valuable, but in doing so, the Court unwittingly blurred the line between
commercial speech and political speech. Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun
argued that commercial speech, like political speech, could relate to matters of
public interest.243 “As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information,” Justice Blackmun announced, “that interest may be as
keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political
debate.”244 This was true, according to Justice Blackmun, because “[t]hose
whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest are
the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged.”245 He explained at length:
A disproportionate amount of their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs;
yet they are the least able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist,
where their scarce dollars are best spent. When drug prices vary as strikingly as
they do, information as to who is charging what becomes more than a convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic
necessities.246

Hence, Justice Blackmun emphasized that advertisement regarding drug
prices could be crucial for consumers.
There was in his remarks the implication that commercial speech could, in
its way, be construed as political speech as well. How this could be so can be
illustrated with a hypothetical. Agnes is an eighty-year-old resident of Alabama.
She suffers from a chronic medical problem that requires expensive prescription
drugs. Without the medicine, her life would be imperiled. Based on online advertisements posted by a pharmacy in Virginia, Agnes learns that she can purchase the same drug at a much lower price if she buys it in Virginia than from
any vendor in Alabama. For Agnes, then, the advertisement from Virginia can
be interpreted as a form of political speech. This is because the advertisement
could be read as an unintended commentary about the failure of Alabama’s
239

Id. at 749–50 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54–524.35 (1974)).
Id. at 768 (“Price advertising, it is said, will reduce the pharmacist’s status to that of a mere
retailer.”).
241 Id. at 754.
242 Id. at 770.
243 Id. at 764 (“Even an individual advertisement, though entirely ‘commercial,’ may be of
general public interest.”).
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government to regulate prices in a manner that is fair to its residents. The advertisement for less expensive drugs in Virginia can serve as a powerful indictment—probably far more effective than a standard political editorial—for how
Alabama’s politicians have not protected its residents from price gouging. Worth
emphasizing in this regard is Justice Blackmun’s statement that information relating to drug prices “hits the hardest” those who are “the poor, the sick, and
particularly the aged.” 247 From the perspectives of such people, advertisement
about something as vital as drug prices can also function as tacit editorials about
the denial of social justice, the insidiousness of lobbying efforts by rich drug
companies, and the potential for corruption by elected officials. Indeed, it seems
to border on the absurd that the highest constitutional protection should be extended unblinkingly to a dreadfully written editorial that denounces skyrocketing
prices for prescription drugs, but that the same protection should be offered only
begrudgingly to “commercial” speech whose lucid details and cogent arguments
prove vital to the elderly cash-strapped consumer. In Virginia Pharmacy, Justice
Blackmun seemed to be alluding to this lamentable irony when he wrote the following sentence: “As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than
his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”248
To be sure, Justice Blackmun conceded in Virginia Pharmacy that “not all
commercial messages contain the same or even a very great public interest element.”249 Nonetheless, he immediately qualified, “[t]here are few to which such
an element . . . could not be added.”250 With this latter remark, Justice Blackmun
nearly obliterated his own demarcation between commercial speech and political
speech. His subsequent statements in Virginia Pharmacy further erased the line
between the two. Justice Blackmun observed that “[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price.”251 He continued:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation
of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable.252

What is being suggested by Justice Blackmun in the passage has profound
consequences for blurring the distinction between commercial speech and political speech. According to Justice Blackmun, trying to ensure that consumers
make good decisions about how they spend their money—about how they
247
248
249
250
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determine the “allocation of our resources”—is “a matter of public interest.”253
Justice Blackmun thereby implied that speech that proposed a commercial transaction could also be thought of in terms of “public interest,” and hence also in
terms of politics.
There are other Supreme Court cases besides Virginia Pharmacy that contain
examples of “commercial” speech that can also be construed as “political”
speech. A relevant illustration is Bigelow v. Virginia,254 a case that Justice
Blackmun had cited in Virginia Pharmacy.255 Bigelow paved the way for Virginia Pharmacy. The Bigelow Court did, in effect, protect commercial speech,
but unlike its successor Virginia Pharmacy, Bigelow sought to protect what was
arguably commercial speech by characterizing it as something that was better
understood as political speech. In Bigelow, a newspaper in Virginia had published an advertisement for an abortion clinic in New York City.256 Bigelow was
the publisher of the newspaper and was charged with violating a Virginia law
that prohibited advertisements that “encourage[d] or prompt[ed] the procuring of
abortion.”257 As he would do one year later for the Court in Virginia Pharmacy,
Justice Blackmun authored the Court’s opinion in Bigelow. He first asserted that
“[t]he fact that the particular advertisement in appellant’s newspaper had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate
all First Amendment guarantees.”258 Justice Blackmun elaborated:
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience—not only to readers possibly in need of the
services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State and its development, and to
readers seeking reform in Virginia.259

In the passage, Justice Blackmun characterized the commercial speech regarding abortion services as possessing copious political meaning. He added that
the advertisement in Bigelow contained substantial political meaning because,
only two years before the Court had decided Bigelow, the Court had decided in
Roe v. Wade that a woman was entitled to a fundamental right of abortion.260
The advertisement at issue in Bigelow related to abortion at a time when
abortion was not widely available in the United States. The advertisement in Bigelow alerted readers that abortion clinics were readily available in New York
City and thus offered an alternative to the sexually restrictive norms of Virginia.
Outside Virginia, women enjoyed greater access in 1975 to exercise their newly
253
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255 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749 n.1.
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won right of abortion.261 The advertisement for abortion at issue in Bigelow appeared in the Virginia Weekly, a newspaper whose main audience consisted of
the students at the University of Virginia.262 The advertisement could thus be
interpreted as a political statement intended to educate the students in the then
provincial locale of Charlottesville about how, in cosmopolitan centers like New
York City in 1975, a woman was welcome to exercise her fundamental right of
abortion. Presented in this light, the advertisement relating to abortion could also
be seen as a species of political speech.
Perhaps realizing the difficulty of defining “commercial” speech in relation
to other categories like political speech, the Supreme Court has taken affirmative
steps to define it.263 The Court’s most sustained attempt to define commercial
speech appears in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. in 1983.264 There, the
Court stated that commercial speech was characterized by a combination of three
factors. One, the speech “conceded to be advertisements.”265 Two, the speech
referred to “a specific product.”266 Three, the speech had “an economic motivation.”267 The problem with this three-part definition is that it does not recognize
how “commercial” speech that contained all three properties could nonetheless
be construed also as political.
Consider the facts of Bolger. At issue in Bolger was a law that forbade unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives.268 The Bolger Court decided that the
speech at hand amounted to commercial speech.269 Yet the speech could just as
easily have been characterized as political. The unsolicited advertisement in Bolger consisted of two documents.270 One was titled “Condoms and Human Sexuality.”271 The document was, according to the Court, “a 12-page pamphlet describing the use, manufacture, desirability, and availability of condoms, and
providing detailed descriptions of various Trojan-brand condoms manufactured
by Youngs.”272 The pamphlet thus contained information relating to a particular
product that Youngs sought to sell. But there was political content too. The pamphlet was conveying information about how to exercise the fundamental right of
reproductive freedom and the moral acceptability of doing so. The pamphlet thus
touched on something that could be seen as a political issue. That the federal
261
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government tried to suppress such information rendered the commercial speech
all the more political in content. For the seemingly nonpolitical discussion of
“Condoms and Human Sexuality” now took on a more political cast by being
seen as the expression of a defiant desire to subvert the government’s notions
about sexual propriety and reproductive freedom.
The second pamphlet in Bolger could also be read as a form of political
speech. Titled “Plain Talk about Venereal Disease,” the “eight-page pamphlet
discuss[ed] at length the problem of venereal disease and the use and advantages
of condoms in aiding the prevention of venereal disease.”273 In this second document, “[t]he only identification of Youngs or its products is at the bottom of the
last page of the pamphlet, which states that the pamphlet has been contributed as
a public service by Youngs, the distributor of Trojan-brand prophylactics.”274
Even more than the first pamphlet, the second pamphlet explicitly dealt with a
public health problem (venereal disease) and how individuals could protect
themselves from it by using condoms. Implicit in this message was the implication—an expression of political speech—that the government could not solve the
problem on its own.
It is not an exaggeration to suggest that even garden-variety examples of
commercial speech that appear to be devoid of political content can reasonably
be construed as containing such content. Consider 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island.275 In that Supreme Court case from 1996, Rhode Island forbade advertisements that included the price of any alcoholic beverage sold in the state.276 Rhode
Island claimed that it was trying to promote temperance, health, and, by indirectly discouraging drunk driving, safety.277 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens concluded that promoting such ends was a substantial government interest,
but he struck down the law as a violation of the First Amendment because its
means did not directly advance its stated goal and were more extensive than necessary.278 To justify the Court’s decision, Justice Stevens first reaffirmed the
Court’s precedent in Virginia Pharmacy that commercial speech was protected.279 He then concluded that the advertisement at issue in 44 Liquormart was
commercial speech.280
The contents in the advertisement could also be viewed as political speech,
however. Rhode Island claimed that its advertisement ban was meant to promote
temperance, health, and safety.281 The advertisement for vodka and rum in 44
273
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Liquormart could be read as mocking the very notion of temperance, health, and
safety. After all, the advertisement “include[d] the word ‘WOW’ in large letters
next to pictures of vodka and rum bottles.”282 Instead of paying lip service to the
civic virtues of temperance and the like, the advertisement celebrates, without
any remorse, the pleasures of imbibing hard liquor. In doing so, the advertisement could be interpreted as a form of political speech. The point of the advertisement was not to counsel temperance, health, and safety, as the politicians of
Rhode Island would wish, but to delight the consumer with a “WOW” opportunity to drink abundant quantities of hard liquor at cheap prices—consequences
be damned. The advertisement served as a kind of political opinion that thumbed
its nose at the solemn aspirations of the Rhode Island legislature to encourage
widespread temperance and its associated benefits in health and safety.
As the foregoing discussion has suggested, the Supreme Court’s purported
distinctions between political speech and nonpolitical speech seem porous. The
subsequent section takes a different approach. It argues that even if the distinctions are tenable, political speech should not be granted special protection because such protection has been used by speakers to assault civility and dignity as
well as to diminish opportunities for obtaining political truth.
III. HOW PRIVILEGING POLITICAL SPEECH UNDERMINES CIVILITY, DIGNITY,
AND TRUTH
Another problem with the Court’s embrace of political speech as worthy of
the highest protection is that the Court has not convincingly explained why privileging political speech outweighs the harms that such privileging causes. While
the harm can come in various guises, the principal harms caused by political
speech are against civility, the dignity that civility makes possible, and, perhaps
unexpectedly, political truth.
A. Threat to Civility and Dignity
To examine how political speech undermines dignity and civility, let us
begin with New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court case that set the precedent for extending extraordinary protection for political speech that was nonetheless defamatory.283 According to the common law of torts, a statement that is
defamatory is generally unprotected.284 There is a good reason why. A defamatory statement is one that makes a false representation of fact and, by doing so,

U.S. 484 (No. 94–1140), 1995 WL 500727 (quoting GEORGE A. HACKER & LAURA ANN
STUART, DOUBLE DIP: THE SIMULTANEOUS DECLINE OF ALCOHOL ADVERTISEMENT AND
ALCOHOL PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1995)).
282 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 492.
283 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–73 (1964).
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hurts a person’s reputation.285 In New York Times, however, the Supreme Court
established an exception for political statements.286 New York Times has been
lauded for enhancing opportunities for people, as a self-governing body, to discover political truth. What the New York Times Court failed to do, however, was
to explain why the Court’s purported search for truth outweighed the need to
protect the norms of civility and the right to individual dignity.
This Article has already examined in Part I the New York Times Court’s emphasis on the search for truth within the context of self-government. The Article
will presently address the competing value of civility that was rendered severely
vulnerable by the Court’s introduction of the actual malice test. Despite its conventional affiliation with politeness, civility is more than good manners.287 Civility is indispensable as the social glue that holds a community together by
preempting conflict.288 For “[c]ivility . . . is the sum of the many sacrifices we
are called to make for the sake of living together.”289 Civility, so conceived, is
the means by which we obtain societal peace.290 Note here the etymological intimations of civility’s function as a social adhesive; we find derivations of the
word “civility” in “civilization” and “civil” society.291 The creation and recognition of rules of civility also serve as a means for a community to define its moral
identity as a collection of beings to whom a duty of respectful behavior is owed.
Offensive speech like defamation is therefore not only a violation of a person’s
right to civility, but also a violation of the community’s right to expect civility
from its members.
Of course, the harm produced by offensive speech is usually felt more painfully by the individual victim than by the community. This particular harm
against the individual differs from the harm that offensive speech inflicts on the
community because the individual, unlike the community, suffers the harm to
her dignity.292 For an individual derives her sense of self-worth—her dignity—
285
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371, 378–81 (2003) (arguing that civility is the basis for civil society) [hereinafter Kang, Insincerity]; John M. Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 261,
293–97 (2009) (making an analogous argument) [hereinafter Kang, Manliness].
288 Kang, Manliness, supra note 287, at 293–94; Kang, Insincerity, supra note 284, at 378–
81.
289 STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY
11 (1998); see also Kang, Insincerity, supra note 287, at 378–81 (making a similar argument).
290 Kang, Insincerity, supra note 287, at 378–80.
291 For further etymological associations that derive from “civility,” see Kang, Manliness,
supra note 287, at 293–94.
292 ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT
128–29 (1995); see also DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 196–97
(1986).
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in large part from how others treat her, a belief that has found support from sociologists.293 So too it is an article of faith that has been eagerly adopted by institutions seeking to denigrate the individual’s sense of self-worth for the purpose
of controlling that individual.294 The sociologist Erving Goffman has found such
examples of systematic degradation in “total institutions,” institutions dedicated
to the complete regulation of the individual, such as prisons, concentration
camps, and mental hospitals.295
Given the centrality of civility to the individual’s dignity, it is unsurprising
that the common law of defamation, which currently finds expression in different
state jurisdictions, seeks to protect “the standing of the person in the eyes of others.”296 In Rosenblatt v. Baer, Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, asserted
the morality of protecting said standing.297 Adjudicated in 1966, Rosenblatt was
a defamation case that afforded the Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit the
actual malice test fashioned two years before in New York Times v. Sullivan.298
The Court in New York Times had described the actual malice test as a means to
bolster public discourse about political affairs in a democracy. Writing for the
Court, Justice Brennan had commended the actual malice test as a means to facilitate a culture dedicated to the principle that political speech should be “uninhibited, robust and wide-open.”299 By contrast, Justice Stewart in his Rosenblatt
concurrence feared that the actual malice test empowered political speech to unjustly assault people’s dignity.300 He wrote in his Rosenblatt concurrence that
“[t]he right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified
invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being.”301 By stating that dignity is
293

This thesis has found support from sociologists. See POST, supra note 292, at 128–29. The
University of Chicago sociologist George Herbert Mead examined how a person derives his
sense of individual identity by belonging to some group and by adopting the group’s view of
himself. GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL
BEHAVIORIST 162 (Charles W. Morris ed., 1934) (“What goes to make up the organized self is
the organization of the attitudes which are common to the group. A person is a personality
because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community
into his own conduct.”).
294 See POST, supra note 292, at 128.
295 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961). Goffman observed:
The recruit comes into the [total institution] with a conception of himself made possible by certain
stable social arrangements in his home world. Upon entrance, he is immediately stripped of the
support provided by these arrangements. In the accurate language of some of the oldest total institutions, he begins a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self.
His self is systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified.

Id. at 14.
296 POST, supra note 289, at 128.
297 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
298 Id. at 80–83 (majority opinion).
299 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 256, 270 (1964).
300 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 91–92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
301 Id. at 92.
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something that is possessed by “every human being,”302 Justice Stewart implied
that dignity differed from honor. Honor, unlike dignity, was something that was
ascribed by others to recognize an individual’s power or status.303 As observed
in seventeenth-century England by the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, “the
acknowledgement of power is called Honour.”304 “HONOURABLE are those
signs for which one man acknowledgeth power or excess above his concurrent
in another,” Hobbes observed.305 It was no wonder that “honor,” instead of dignity, was the preferred term for Hobbes, who inhabited a Britain ruled by a culture of hierarchy and monarchism.306
On the other hand, “dignity” was the idiom of democracy. It was something
that each person, irrespective of status, was entitled to. Remember that Justice
Stewart had underscored in Rosenblatt that dignity was that which belonged to
“every human being.”307 Moreover, dignity for Justice Stewart was something
more than an indispensable normative concept. For him, the need to protect a
person’s dignity was “a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”308 Justice Stewart explained that “[t]he protection of private personality,
like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to
any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.”309
It was this commitment to individual dignity that was threatened by defamation. In his concurrence in Rosenblatt, Justice Stewart thus admonished that
“[w]e use misleading euphemisms when we speak of the New York Times rule as
involving ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate,’ or ‘vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp’ criticism.”310 Let us be clear, he cautioned,
“What the New York Times rule ultimately protects is defamatory falsehood.”311
The upshot for Justice Stewart was that “[n]o matter how gross the untruth, the
New York Times rule deprives a defamed public official of any hope for legal
redress without proof that the lie was a knowing one, or uttered in reckless disregard of the truth.”312 Accordingly, Justice Stewart counseled that the actual
malice test “should not be applied except where a State’s law of defamation has
been unconstitutionally converted into a law of seditious libel.”313 With these

302

Id. (emphasis added).
Kang, Manliness, supra note 287, at 296–97.
304 THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW NATURAL AND POLITIC 48 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1650).
305 Id.
306 Kang, Manliness, supra note 287, at 276.
307 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 93. Seditious libel is a crime that provokes dissatisfaction with the government.
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words, Justice Stewart in Rosenblatt paid due regard to how the harm of defamation could prove devastating to a person’s dignity.
Given the crucial role of civility as a means to underwrite dignity, one would
expect the Court in New York Times to furnish a sustained justification for why
the Court was willing to sacrifice civility in order to create the actual malice test.
Regrettably, the Court in New York Times hardly even addressed the topic of
civility. Writing for the Court in New York Times, Justice Brennan devoted his
energy to an unqualified celebration of political speech, and he essentially ignored the ethical consequences of the actual malice test. Without any ambivalence, he announced: “The general proposition that freedom of expression upon
public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our
decisions.”314 Justice Brennan then added that “[t]he constitutional safeguard, we
have said, ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’ ”315 Summing
up, Justice Brennan penned what would become the most quoted line from his
New York Times opinion: “Thus we consider this case against the background of
a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”316
As explained previously, Justice Brennan’s support for the actual malice test
was founded on the argument from self-government.317 The merits of the argument from self-government have already been addressed in this Article and been
found wanting.
Yet even if the argument from self-government possessed merit, Justice
Brennan in New York Times did not explain why said argument deserved to be
accorded greater weight than the counter value of civility. Justice Brennan did
not even try to weigh the two. There was no mention whatsoever in his opinion
of civility, dignity, or their correlates. Put bluntly, Justice Brennan opted to substitute pronouncements for explanations. He asserted that “we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited.”318 Justice Brennan never mentioned that civility and dignity were at stake as countervalues to the right to engage in profoundly hurtful political speech.
In fact, one cannot help but feel that the Court decided to take up New York
Times v. Sullivan on appeal—out of all the potential cases available to the
Court—because the facts of New York Times provided a convenient narrative of
Good versus Evil. This narrative made it easier for the public to accept the morally thorny consequences of the actual malice test. On one side of the New York
314
315
316
317
318

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 269 (1964).
Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
Id. at 270 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
See supra Sections I.A–I.B.
N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
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Times narrative were a group of civil rights workers who in 1964 protested racial
discrimination by local officials in Montgomery, Alabama.319 They paid the
Times to publish what the Court dubbed an “advertisement,” albeit one that
brimmed with political content.320 Consider how Justice Brennan summarized
the advertisement as pregnant with political content:
Entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices,” the advertisement began by stating that “As
the whole world knows by now, thousands of Southern Negro students are engaged in widespread nonviolent demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right
to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.”321

Another section of the advertisement also spoke of political affairs. It alleged
that the protestors, “in their efforts to uphold these guarantees,” are “being met
by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny and negate that
document which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modern
freedom.”322
L. B. Sullivan was one of the Commissioners of Montgomery.323 In that role,
he was responsible for supervising the police.324 Sullivan alleged that some portions of the advertisement were libelous.325 Justice Brennan conceded, “It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in the [advertisement] were
not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in Montgomery.”326 Among
these statements were the following:
Although Negro students staged a demonstration on the State Capital steps, they
sang the National Anthem and not “My Country, ’Tis of Thee.” Although nine
students were expelled by the State Board of Education, this was not for leading
the demonstration at the Capitol, but for demanding service at a lunch counter in
the Montgomery County Courthouse on another day.327

A few other details were deemed inaccurate by the Court: “Dr. King had not
been arrested seven times, but only four; and although he claimed to have been
assaulted some years earlier in connection with his arrest for loitering outside a
courtroom, one of the officers who made the arrest denied that there was such an
assault.”328
There are two things worth mentioning about these factually erroneous statements.

319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328

Id. at 257.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 259.
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First, while they might be, to quote Justice Brennan, “uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open,”329 they surely do not qualify, to quote him further, as “vehement, caustic, and . . . unpleasantly sharp.”330 For by 1964, the violence being
perpetuated by Alabama’s officials against King and his supporters was well
known.331 Moreover, Sullivan was never mentioned by name in the advertisement. Therefore, while some of the statements in the advertisement were false,
the falsity did not seem material or likely to injure Sullivan’s reputation, let alone
his dignity.
Second, even if the representations by the protestors were false, the Court
observed that Sullivan “made no effort to prove that he suffered actual pecuniary
loss as a result of the alleged libel.”332 None of the witnesses whom Sullivan
called “testified that [they] had actually believed the statements in their supposed
reference to respondent.”333 Nevertheless, a jury in Montgomery awarded Sullivan damages of $500,000, the full amount claimed, and the Supreme Court of
Alabama affirmed.334
As the above-mentioned facts suggest, the white community in Montgomery, far from seeing Sullivan as a victim whose dignity was tarnished, almost
certainly saw him as an esteemed member in their community of white supremacists.335 It is quite unlikely, therefore, that Sullivan’s dignity had been impugned. Other factors also bolstered the belief that Sullivan’s dignity remained
wholly intact after publication of the advertisement. For one thing, the trial judge
in Sullivan’s case was Walter Burgwyn Jones, a rabid white supremacist.336
Jones was the author of The Confederate Creed, which read in part:
With unfaltering trust in the God of my fathers, I believe, as a Confederate, in
obedience to Him; that it is my duty to respect the laws and ancient ways of my
people, and to stand up for the right of my State to determine what is good for its
people in all local affairs.337

The degree to which Sullivan had the support of white Alabamans was
evinced by the fact that the Times had trouble finding a local attorney to represent

329

Id. at 270.
Id.
331 King was in fact awarded that Nobel Peace Prize in 1964 for his efforts to advance civil
rights for black Americans, chiefly in Alabama. See S. Jonathan Bass, Martin Luther King,
Jr., ENCYC. ALA., http://encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1426 [https://perma.cc/64FS-2Y
XB].
332 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 260.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 256.
335 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 731–32 (1986).
336 Id. at 731.
337 Id. (quoting Anthony Lewis, Annals of Law: The Sullivan Case, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5,
1984, at 54).
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it at the trial.338 The New York counsel for the Times, moreover, had to register
fearfully under an assumed name when he traveled to Alabama for the trial.339
Justice Black, who supported the actual malice test, brought to the fore the
history of white supremacy that pervaded Montgomery. As a native of Alabama
and a Klansman in his youth,340 Justice Black could issue the following words
with authority: “Montgomery is one of the localities in which widespread hostility to desegregation has been manifested. This hostility has sometimes extended
itself to persons who favor desegregation, particularly to so-called ‘outside agitators,’ a term which can be made to fit papers like the Times, which is published
in New York.”341
Justice Black added, “The scarcity of testimony to show that Commissioner
Sullivan suffered any actual damages at all suggests that these feelings of hostility had at least as much to do with rendition of this half-million-dollar verdict as
did an appraisal of damages.”342 Were the characters and circumstances of New
York Times different, public support for the actual malice test could well have
been diminished. Fortunately for the Court, the facts of New York Times did not
require the Court to justify why civility should be sacrificed for the benefit of
political speech.
In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the Court was unable to enjoy the luxury
afforded in New York Times.343 Unlike L. B. Sullivan, the plaintiff in Hustler had
suffered at the hands of political speech an appalling injury to his dignity. The
story of Hustler involved two men who appeared to be utter opposites:
On‐air host of the “Old Time Gospel Hour,” the Reverend Jerry Falwell was a
conservative and unusually influential Baptist preacher who publicly condemned
pornography. Larry Flynt was the eccentric and foul‐mouthed publisher of the
scandalously X‐rated Hustler.
For years, Flynt raged against Falwell and other leaders of what the former
derided as “organized religion.” Flynt resented their moral denunciations of pornography and angrily mocked them as blowhard hypocrites. In November 1983
Flynt raised his loathing to new heights by publishing a now infamous parody of
Falwell. The parody was meant to spoof the Campari Liqueur ads popular in the
1980s, in which a contrived interviewer asked a celebrity about her “first time,”
with the latter phrase playing with the double entendre of the celebrity’s first time
sipping Campari and her first time trying sex. Hustler’s ad parody depict[ed] Falwell casually narrating his first time having sex with his mother. The cruel ribaldry unleashed by Hustler against Falwell can be best conveyed by reproducing
the parody in its entirety:
Falwell: My first time was in an outhouse outside Lynchburg, Virginia.
Interviewer: Wasn’t it a little cramped?
338
339
340
341
342
343

Id.
Id.
HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 98–99 (1996).
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (Black, J., concurring).
Id.
Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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Falwell: Not after I kicked the goat out.
Interviewer: I see. You must tell me all about it.
Falwell: I never really expected to make it with Mom, but then after she
showed all the other guys in town such a good time, I figured, “What the
hell!”
Interviewer: But your mom? Isn’t that a bit odd?
Falwell: I don’t think so. Looks don’t mean that much to me in a woman.
Interviewer: Go on.
Falwell: Well, we were drunk off our God-fearing asses on Campari, ginger ale and soda—that’s called a Fire and Brimstone—at the time. And
Mom looked better than a Baptist whore with a $100 donation.
Interviewer: Campari in the crapper with Mom . . . how interesting. Well,
how was it?
Falwell: The Campari was great, but Mom passed out before I could come.
Interviewer: Did you ever try it again?
Falwell: Sure . . . lots of times. But not in the outhouse. Between Mom
and the shit, the flies were too much to bear.
Interviewer: We meant the Campari.
Falwell: Oh, yeah, I always get sloshed before I go out to the pulpit. You
don’t think I could lay down all that bullshit sober, do you?
Accompanying the parody was an unexpectedly guarded disclaimer written in
tiny but readable letters at the bottom: “AD PARODY—NOT TO BE TAKEN
SERIOUSLY.” Hustler’s table of contents also echoed that the depiction of Falwell was “Fiction” and “Ad & Personality Parody.” These lawyerly addendums
were unable to salve the wounded Reverend Falwell, whose staffer had forwarded
him a copy of the salacious magazine. “I somehow felt that in all of my life I had
never believed that human beings could do something like this,” he rued. “I really
felt like weeping.” He felt like doing something more than weeping: Falwell sued
Flynt and his magazine for $45 million.344

Falwell presented three causes of action against Flynt: one for invasion of
privacy, the second for libel, and the third for emotional distress.345 Falwell lost
on the first two claims.346 On the invasion of privacy claim, Falwell lost because
he could not show, in accordance with Virginia law, that Flynt had appropriated
Falwell’s name or likeness for “advertising.”347 After all, Hustler’s parody was
not an advertisement, just a spoof of one.348 Falwell also was unable to persuade
the jury that he was a victim of libel because a libel claim in Virginia required
the plaintiff to show that the defendant had made an inaccurate factual representation regarding the plaintiff.349 But Hustler had never made any representations
344

John M. Kang, Hustler v. Falwell: Worst Case in the History of the World, Maybe the
Universe, 12 NEV. L.J. 582, 585–86 (2012) (citing RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V.
LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (1988)).
345 Falwell v. Flynt, No. 83-0155, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20586, at *1 (W.D. Va. Apr. 19,
1985), aff’d, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
346 Id. at *1–2.
347 Id. at *1.
348 Id.; see also SMOLLA, supra note 344, at app. I.
349 Falwell, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20586, at *2.
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of fact; it had offered only parody.350 The jury thus denied recovery on the cause
of action for libel.351 Falwell, however, won $150,000 on the claim for emotional
distress, a verdict upheld by the federal appellate court.352 Flynt appealed the
verdict on the claim of emotional distress, and the U.S. Supreme Court eventually decided in his favor.353
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, did not deny that the
parody was reprehensible, yet insisted that it deserved First Amendment protection.354 For support, he argued that offensive, even abhorrent, speech was entitled
to protection under certain circumstances so that the audience would be more
likely to discover the political truth.355 “At the heart of the First Amendment,”
he declared, “is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow
of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”356 Here again
was the argument from self-government that was on offer by Justice Brennan in
New York Times. The protective spirit of the actual malice test was extended to
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.357 It was true that Reverend
Falwell, unlike L. B. Sullivan, was not a public official, but Falwell surely exercised greater political power on a national level than did Sullivan.358 Therefore,
while Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reference to “matters of public interest and concern”359 was ambiguous, the facts of the case clearly indicated that the reason the
Hustler Court was willing to extend the protectiveness of the actual malice test
to Larry Flynt was because the latter’s mockery of Falwell amounted to political
speech directed against a powerful political figure. Like Justice Brennan in New
York Times, Chief Justice Rehnquist in Hustler argued that access to a wider
array of political opinions and ideas would help the public to arrive at more enlightened conclusions about politics. Chief Justice Rehnquist accordingly announced in Hustler: “[T]he freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of
individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common quest for truth.”360

350

See id. at *1–2; see also SMOLLA, supra note 344, at app. I.
Falwell, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20586, at *2.
352 Id; see also Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273, 1275, 1278 (4th Cir. 1986).
353 Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988).
354 See id. at 50–57.
355 Id. at 50–51.
356 Id. at 50.
357 See id. at 49–50.
358 See Peter Applebome, Jerry Falwell, Moral Majority Founder, Dies at 73, N.Y. TIMES
(May 16, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/obituaries/16falwell.html [https://per
ma.cc/39CC-ZY5N] (describing Falwell as having played an important role in electing conservative politicians into federal positions).
359 Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. at 50.
360 Id. at 50–51 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–
04 (1984)). Note how Chief Justice Rehnquist’s justification for the right of speech is consistent with those offered by Sunstein, Meiklejohn, and Justice Brennan.
351

22 NEV. L.J. 803

Spring 2022]

AGAINST POLITICAL SPEECH

853

Unfortunately, Chief Justice Rehnquist, like Justice Brennan in New York
Times, failed to explain why the search for political truth should take priority
over the desire to honor the claims of civility and individual dignity. Like his
fellow jurist Brennan, the Chief Justice did not even mention civility or dignity
as things to be weighed on the other side of the search for political truth, or, as
this Article has called it, the argument from self-government. In its nine pithy
pages, the Court’s opinion in Hustler made virtually no mention about the harms
presented by Flynt’s vicious parody.
Hustler is not the only example of how the Court protects savagely caustic
words in the name of political speech. An especially unsettling illustration of the
Court’s zealous devotion to what it styles political speech is Snyder v. Phelps.361
Albert Snyder’s son was Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder.362 Lance Corporal Snyder was killed in Iraq while serving his country.363 Fred Phelps was the
founder of the Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas.364 Phelps’s church
“believes that God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s military.”365 Snyder arranged for a Catholic funeral for his son in Maryland.366 Upon learning through newspapers that
Snyder intended to hold funeral services for his son in Maryland, Phelps traveled
to Maryland to picket the military, the government, and the Catholic Church.367
Phelps and six other Westboro Baptist parishioners stood on “public land adjacent to the public streets near . . . Matthew Snyder’s funeral.”368 The parishioners
carried signs that read in part: “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,”
“Priests Rape Boys,” “God Hates Fags,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God
Hates You.”369
Snyder sued Phelps for intentional infliction of emotional distress.370 The
Court denied Snyder’s claim.371 Like it did in Hustler Magazine, the Court emphasized that the speech at issue, while hurtful, touched on matters of public
concern. The Court quoted itself from a previous case: “[S]peech on ‘matters of
public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’ ”372 The
Snyder Court also recited Justice Brennan’s words from the New York Times
case: “The First Amendment reflects ‘a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide361

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
Id. at 448.
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372 Id. at 451–52 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758–59 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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open.’ ”373 Further, the Court underscored that “speech on public issues occupies
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to
special protection.”374 The Snyder Court also asserted that “[t]he arguably ‘inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question
whether it deals with a matter of public concern.’ ”375
Armed with these prefatory remarks, the Court pronounced that “[t]he ‘content’ of Westboro’s signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at
large, rather than matters of ‘purely private concern.’ ”376 Referring to placards
held by the Westboro Baptist Church, the Court sought to clarify that “[w]hile
these messages may fall short of refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlight—the political and moral conduct of the United States and its
citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public import.”377 Accordingly, the
placards were deemed to be of public concern, and the cause of action for emotional distress by Snyder was denied.378 Such was the opinion of the Court.
It was Justice Alito, writing a lone dissent, who shed light on how the Court’s
uncritical devotion to political speech jarringly undermined the civility owed to
Snyder. Justice Alito began his dissenting opinion with these words: “Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.”379 Justice Alito reminded the
reader that “[p]etitioner Albert Snyder is not a public figure.”380 Rather, he “is
simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed
in Iraq.”381 “Mr. Snyder,” Justice Alito continued, “wanted what is surely the
right of any parent who experiences such an incalculable loss: to bury his son in
peace.”382 Justice Alito elaborated:
But respondents, members of the Westboro Baptist Church, deprived him of that
elementary right. They first issued a press release and thus turned Matthew’s funeral into a tumultuous media event. They then appeared at the church, approached as closely as they could without trespassing, and launched a malevolent
verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a time of acute emotional vulnerability.
As a result, Albert Snyder suffered severe and lasting emotional injury. The Court
now holds that the First Amendment protected respondents’ right to brutalize Mr.
Snyder. I cannot agree.383
373

Id. at 452. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
Id. at 452 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
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375 Id. at 453 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987)).
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What specifically galled Justice Alito was that Phelps felt no compulsion to
defend the injury that he had caused Snyder. Under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must show that defendant’s conduct was “outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.”384 Justice Alito called attention to the fact that “the elements of the IIED tort are difficult to meet, [but Phelps] long ago abandoned any
effort to show that those tough standards were not satisfied here.”385 Indeed,
“[o]n appeal, [Phelps] chose not to contest the sufficiency of the evidence.”386
Phelps, Justice Alito reminded, “did not dispute that Mr. Snyder suffered
‘wounds that are truly severe and incapable of healing themselves.’ ”387 Nor “did
[Phelps and his parishioners] dispute that their speech was ‘so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ”388 Instead, Phelps “maintained that the First Amendment gave [him] a
license to engage in such conduct.”389 It was an argument that found favor with
the Court.390
Political speech was elevated in Snyder to take priority over the moral norms
of civility. The Court did not ask whether Phelps’s political speech could be expressed in a less brutal manner or in a venue where its impact on Snyder would
be lessened. If anything, the Snyder Court almost seemed as if it were trying to
argue that Phelps’s speech was not as objectionable as Justice Alito had suggested. In the Court’s telling, Phelps and his parishioners were exceedingly
peaceful and, in their way, behaved with becoming civility:
Westboro [Baptist Church] alerted local authorities to its funeral protest and fully
complied with police guidance on where the picketing could be staged. The picketing was conducted under police supervision some 1,000 feet from the church,
out of the sight of those at the church. The protest was not unruly; there was no
shouting, profanity, or violence.391

While the Court characterized Phelps’s speech as political, Justice Alito reminded the reader of the viciousness of the latter’s words, and why they were
best interpreted as a tort, not as an expression of potentially valuable ideas. “It
does not follow,” argued Justice Alito, that speakers “may intentionally inflict
severe emotional injury on private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public
debate.”392 Such harms, moreover, were not inevitable. Justice Alito pointed out
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392

Id. at 464 (quoting Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977)).
Id. at 464–65.
Id. at 465.
Id. (quoting Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69, 75 (Md. 1991)).
Id. (quoting Harris, 380 A.2d at 614).
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Id. at 461.
Id. at 457 (majority opinion).
Id. at 464 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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that alternatives were available for Phelps to express his political views without
devastating Snyder and his family. According to Justice Alito, Phelps “could
have picketed the United States Capitol, the White House, the Supreme Court,
the Pentagon, or any of the more than 5,600 military recruiting stations in this
country.”393 Tellingly, the Snyder Court never even bothered to acknowledge
these alternatives. The Court instead acted as if the very thought that Phelps had
to change the venue for his protest was irrelevant as a legal matter because the
issue of Snyder’s emotional welfare was also irrelevant. What mattered for the
Court was that “political” speech should be empowered to express itself, however hurtful and savage its message.
B. Threat to Truth
The foregoing discussion has illustrated how the Court’s excessive protection for political speech has come at the expense of dignity and civility. Political
speech can also paradoxically thwart possibilities for deriving political truth. The
proposition might strike the reader as odd. After all, much of the argument in
favor of the priority of political speech, as this Article has suggested, hinges on
the notion that said priority is crucial for helping people to arrive at better conclusions about how to order their government. Upon closer inspection, however,
it becomes evident that the Supreme Court’s privileging of political speech can
also impede opportunities to find political truth.
Return to the actual malice test. The test provides extraordinary protection
to political speech in order to enrich public discourse. If the speaker’s defamatory
comments related to a public official acting within her official capacity, the official would have to prove that the speaker made the statement knowing it was
false or with reckless disregard for its falsity. The burden on the speaker was thus
formidable; but Justice Brennan in New York Times defended that the point of
the actual malice test was to further the “profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”394
Exhibiting an uncritical confidence, Justice Brennan did not recognize how
the actual malice test is logically barbed. By making officials fair game for fierce
verbal abuse, the actual malice test could produce the unintended effect of impoverishing the marketplace of ideas. Consider how a parent who wishes to improve primary schools in her neighborhood might very well be afraid to seek
public office as a member of the school board, in part because the actual malice
test would render her vulnerable to vicious defamation without the benefit of
legal redress. Should that parent hazard to become a public official, the actual
malice test can have the effect of discouraging her from making controversial
393

Id. at 466.
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public statements for fear that her statements might provoke an onslaught of vitriolic defamation. Justice Brennan himself acknowledged that the actual malice
test protects speakers when they wantonly subject public officials to “vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.”395 The actual malice test—a
contrivance that has been lauded for promoting “uninhibited, robust, and wideopen”396 debate about politics—can theoretically cause a person to refrain from
publicly sharing her political views for fear of fierce retribution by offended
members of the public.
In this fashion, the Supreme Court’s special protection for political speech
can have the effect of chilling speech, the very antithesis of what the Court sought
to do in New York Times. Justice White, dissenting in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
gave voice to this concern.397 He penned this disquieting reflection:
I fail to see how the quality or quantity of public debate will be promoted by
further emasculation of state libel laws for the benefit of the news media. If anything, this trend may provoke a new and radical imbalance in the communications
process. It is not at all inconceivable that virtually unrestrained defamatory remarks about private citizens will discourage them from speaking out and concerning themselves with social problems.398

That the majority of the Gertz Court did not even acknowledge the reasons
for Justice White’s worry is evidence of the myopic worldview that gave rise to
the actual malice test.
There is another way, one that is more palpable of late, in which the Supreme
Court’s privileging of political speech has impoverished the marketplace of ideas
and hindered opportunities to discern political truth. Namely, by indiscriminately
treating all political speech as worthy of higher protection than other categories
of speech, the Court has failed to supply the jurisprudential tools for how to manage the swell of political misinformation, especially on the internet, from inundating the public square, and thus subverting the search for political truth.399
Political misinformation has existed as long as politics has existed, but the
volume of political misinformation has become breathtaking with the advent of
the internet. In Gertz, Justice White worried that “[t]he case against razing state
libel laws is compelling when considered in light of the increasingly prominent
role of mass media in our society and the awesome power it has placed in the
hands of a select few.”400 Justice White offered this observation in 1964, prior to
the advent of the modern internet. Today, an obstacle to the search for political
truth stems less from the fact that mass media is located in “a select few,”401 but
from the opposite scenario: a seemingly infinite proliferation of messages on
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 399–400.
See Wu, supra note 14, at 25–31.
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social media.402 Unlike traditional broadcast media, the internet is available
worldwide and does not require government-issued licenses to operate.403 Moreover, much of the content online is published by anonymous authors who can
evade accountability for their speech.404 This combination of easy anonymity and
vast access has fostered a marketplace of ideas that has become inundated with
false political speech whose principal aim is to instill confusion, sow paranoia,
and promote exhaustion.405
The event that marked the contemporary beginnings of this crisis was the socalled Birther Movement. The Birther Movement was organized around the false
assertion that Barack Obama was born in Kenya and was therefore ineligible to
become President.406 While the allegation lacked merit, whoever uttered it would
be protected under the actual malice test because the substance of the claim concerned a public official acting within his official capacity. Notwithstanding its
falsity, or because of the lurid possibility that it might be true, the birthers’ allegation captured the public’s attention and President Obama found himself having
to respond to it repeatedly.407 Hoping to quell the controversy, he provided a
copy of his longform birth certificate from Hawaii.408 President Obama attended
the disclosure with a member of his Administration responding: “At a time of
great consequence for this country—when we should be debating how we win

402

See Wu, supra note 14, at 31. See generally JAMES GLEICK, THE INFORMATION: A HISTORY,
A THEORY, A FLOOD (2011).
403 As Emily Bazelon has observed: “The founding ethos of the internet was to treat sources
of information equally. Cut loose from traditional gatekeepers—the publishing industry and
the government—the web would provide the world’s first neutral delivery of content.” Bazelon, supra note 24.
404 See Lee Rainie et al., The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-speech-trolls-anonymity-and-fake-news-online/ [https://perma.cc/5GPH-RBN
W]; see also Wu, supra note 14, at 25–28.
405 See Wu, supra note 14, at 25–31; see also Adrian Chen, The Real Paranoia-Inducing Purpose of Russian Hacks, NEW YORKER (July 27, 2016) https://www.newyorker.com/news/new
s-desk/the-real-paranoia-inducing-purpose-of-russian-hacks [https://perma.cc/N3QK-J42T];
Amandeep Dhir et al., Online Social Media Fatigue and Psychological Wellbeing—a Study of
Compulsive Use, Fear of Missing Out, Fatigue, Anxiety and Depression, 40 INT’L J. INFO.
MGMT. 141 (2018); Mark Satta, 3 Reasons for Information Exhaustion—and What to Do
About It, BIG THINK (Nov. 26, 2020), https://bigthink.com/mind-brain/information-exhaustion/ [https://perma.cc/J5WS-5YC9].
406 Adam Serwer, Birtherism of a Nation, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/birtherism-and-trump/610978/ [https://perma.cc/CZ4N-K6D
B].
407 The MIT Media Lab has found that false stories spread much faster than true ones. Dizikes,
supra note 15.
408 Michael D. Shear, With Document, Obama Seeks to End “Birther” Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
27, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/us/politics/28obama.html [https://perma.cc
/25FZ-XQTW].
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the future, reduce our deficit, deal with high gas prices, and bring stability to the
Middle East, Washington, DC, was once again distracted by a fake issue.”409
One year after this statement was published online, Donald Trump, prior to
his presidential ascension, tweeted in 2012 that “[a]n ‘extremely credible source’
has called my office and told me that @BarackObama’s birth certificate is a
fraud.”410 The then reality TV actor never disclosed the identity of his “credible
source,” casting doubt about the existence of the source. Undaunted, in 2014,
Trump again challenged the authenticity of President Obama’s birth certificate,
but this time Trump called upon others to commit a criminal offense to uncover
the truth: “Attention all hackers: You are hacking everything else so please hack
Obama’s college records (destroyed?) and check ‘place of birth.’ ”411 Again, no
reliable evidence of foreign birth was procured. Nevertheless, the political
speech at the heart of the Birther Movement found purchase in the general public.
In 2016, the New York Times reported that fifty-six percent of Republican voters
refused to accept that President Obama had been born in the United States.412
That this survey was conducted after President Obama had served nearly eight
years in the White House lends credence to the thesis that inaccurate political
speech, even after credible evidence has been offered to refute it, can become
entrenched as inviolable truth in the public’s mind. The jarring result of the survey should therefore prompt a reconsideration of the normative desirability of
bestowing the highest protection to political speech.
How heightened protection for political speech can lead people to embrace
outlandish political ideas is on display in the QAnon Movement as well. A core
tenet endorsed by QAnon is that President Obama, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and various Hollywood elites like Tom Hanks are part of a cabal of
cannibal child molesters who have used the “deep state” to gratify their lust. 413
Because the substance of this statement is about public officials and public
409

Dan Pfeiffer, President Obama’s Long Form Birth Certificate, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Apr.
27, 2011, 8:57 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/04/27/president-obam
as-long-form-birth-certificate [https://perma.cc/8GE4-QBNZ].
410 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:33 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/232572505238433794 [https://perma.cc/Y8MX-PDB2].
411 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 6, 2014, 3:06 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/508194635270062080 [https://perma.cc/7NWP-ZALJ].
412 Kyle Dropp & Brendan Nyhan, It Lives. Birthirsm Is Diminished but Far from Dead, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/24/upshot/it-lives-birtherism-isdiminished-but-far-from-dead.html [https://perma.cc/7VCF-GUHN].
413 See Ciara O’Rourke, Old Photos of Barack Obama Misused to Fuel Baseless Child SexTrafficking Conspiracy, POLITIFACT (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/
2020/aug/21/viral-image/old-photos-barack-obama-misused-fuel-baseless-chil/
[https://perma.cc/EE4X-7VSG]; Laurence Arnold, QAnon, the Conspiracy Theory Creeping
into U.S. Politics, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/qanon-the-conspiracy-theorycreeping-into-us-politics/2020/08/21/1a1d4940-e3dd-11ea82d8-5e55d47e90ca_story.html [https://perma.cc/D4SC-H4Z4]; Katie Rogers & Kevin
Roose, Trump Says QAnon Followers Are People Who “Love Our Country,” N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/us/politics/trump-qanon-conspiracytheories.html [https://perma.cc/7A33-B35F].
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figures and a matter of public concern, the QAnon Movement, as with the Birther
Movement, can rest assured knowing that the actual malice test will protect its
outrageous claims. Moreover, as Hustler Magazine underscored, none of the
prominent people who were victims of QAnon’s speech will succeed in a lawsuit
for emotional distress because the logic of the actual malice test has been extended to the tort of emotional distress as well. On the other hand, President
Trump need not feel aggrieved by QAnon because in the latter’s narrative he is
cast in the most positive of lights as an unsung hero who is secretly toiling to
bring the left-wing pedophiles to justice.414 Conspiracy theorists like the flamboyant right-wing radio host Alex Jones have insisted with ferocious conviction
that the narrative is true.415 Dismayingly, President Trump, far from denouncing
QAnon’s morbid fantasy, provided indirect approval in tweets and public remarks.416
While the President’s indulgence of QAnon’s misinformation is appalling in
its own right, the number of Americans who have embraced QAnon as a force
for good in society is equally disturbing.417 QAnon’s conspiracy theory culminated in what has become known as “PizzaGate.”418 A pivotal figure in PizzaGate was Edgar M. Welch, a twenty-eight-year-old resident of North Carolina.419 He armed himself with a military-style rife and a handgun and drove to a
414

Jane Coaston, QAnon, the Scarily Popular Pro-Trump Conspiracy Theory, Explained,
VOX (Aug. 21, 2020, 1:59 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/8/1/1725344
4/qanon-trump-conspiracy-theory-4chan-explainer [https://perma.cc/VR5L-3JE9].
415 Eli Rosenberg, Alex Jones Apologies for Promoting “Pizzagate” Hoax, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/25/business/alex-jones-pizzagate-apology-com
et-ping-pong.html [https://perma.cc/A9PA-KEMN].
416 See Arnold, supra note 413; see also Rogers & Roose, supra note 413 (“For years, Mr.
Trump and his campaign have flirted with the QAnon movement.”). According to the New
York Times, President Trump
has done little to discourage QAnon’s followers. He has described QAnon adherents—several of
whom have been charged with murder, domestic terrorism or planned kidnapping—as “people
that love our country.” His children have posted social media messages related to the conspiracy
theory, and aides have made barely disguised appeals to its followers. The most recent came last
week when Stephen Miller, a top Trump aide, claimed without evidence that Mr. Biden would
“incentivize” child trafficking if elected.

Matthew Rosenberg, A QAnon Supporter Is Headed to Congress, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/03/us/politics/qanon-candidates-marjorie-taylor-greene.
html [https://perma.cc/2NSW-QHUS].
417 The New York Times described PizzaGate’s presence on the Internet as follows:
The conspiracy theory took the Internet by storm. YouTube clips pushed the false story, racking
up hundreds of thousands of views. Tens of thousands of individuals subscribed to message
boards, feeding into theories with fake news reports and crowd-driven detective work. The police
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pizzeria called Comet Ping Pong in Washington, D.C.420 Welch’s purpose in going to Comet was to liberate children whom he believed, based on QAnon chat
boards, were being held captive in the basement of the pizzeria.421 Welch demanded to see the children and fired his rifle inside the pizzeria.422 No basement
existed; no children were held captive.423 Police arrested Welch shortly after he
discharged his weapon.424 This frightening event occurred on December 4,
2016.425 Alarmingly, four years after the bizarre details of Welch’s arrest came
to public light, the Pew Research Center concluded that forty-one percent of Republicans and those leaning Republican nonetheless believed that QAnon is
“somewhat good” or “very good” for the United States.426 Some of these faithful
have acted on their political views by electing in 2020 at least a dozen Republican
congressional candidates who have expressed a degree of support for QAnon.427
The example of QAnon illustrates how political speech, a category of expression
that has been exalted for its ability to enlighten the public, has impoverished, if
not perverted, public discourse in ways that may be irreparable for years.428
While social media has played a powerful role in spreading political misinformation, President Trump himself has inaugurated a frenzy of political misinformation. There is no more alarming example of how political speech can diminish the possibilities for finding truth than the unproven claims by President
Trump and his lawyers that his loss to President Joe Biden was owing to fraud.429
420
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Angrily, President Trump tweeted in all caps on November 7, 2020, “I WON
THIS ELECTION, BY A LOT!”430 On the same day, he tweeted, again in all
caps: “BAD THINGS HAPPENED WHICH OUR OBSERVERS WERE NOT
ALLOWED TO SEE. NEVER HAPPENED BEFORE. MILLIONS OF MAILIN BALLOTS WERE SENT TO PEOPLE WHO NEVER ASKED FOR
THEM!”431 Twitter flagged this tweet as “disputed.”432 President Trump has
made other harrowing allegations. He tweeted on December 26, 2020: “A young
military man working in Afghanistan told me that elections in Afghanistan are
far more secure and much better run than the USA’s 2020 Election. Ours, with
its millions and millions of corrupt Mail-In Ballots, was the election of a third
world country. Fake President!”433 So far, President Trump has been unable to
prove in court any of his provocative claims,434 a result that has failed to quell
the paranoid impulses of many of his followers who suspect that every loss for
President Trump is the handiwork of a malicious deep state.435
The culmination of President Trump’s political misinformation occurred on
January 6, 2021, the day that Congress was scheduled to certify the ballots of the
presidential election. During the normally routine, if staid, affair, a mass of President Trump’s supporters charged the Capitol Building, smashed open doors, and
vandalized and stole federal property.436 Five people died as a result, including a
police officer who was trying to block the rioters.437 The event was shocking to
430
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AM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2020/12/23/donald-trumps-dallas-area-supporters-wont-accept-his-loss-say-populist-movement-continues/ [https://perma.cc/Z58C-AE
BP]. Stunningly, Republican leaders, while urging “unity,” refuse to acknowledge that President Biden won the election fairly, thus creating the impression that the election was the result
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witness, but, in hindsight, it seemed an almost inevitable denouement of a vigorous campaign to spread political misinformation. After all, “[f]or weeks, President Trump and his supporters had been proclaiming Jan. 6, 2021, as a day of
reckoning.”438 As reported by the Times, President Trump had called January 6
the day “to gather in Washington to ‘save America’ and ‘stop the steal’ of the
election he had decisively lost, but which he still maintained—often through a
toxic brew of conspiracy theories—that he had won by a landslide.”439 On the
appointed day, President Trump “rallied thousands of his supporters with an incendiary speech. Then a large mob of those supporters, many waving Trump
flags and wearing Trump regalia, violently stormed the Capitol to take over the
halls of government and send elected officials into hiding, fearing for their
safety.”440 In spite of the fact that they were founded on false assumptions,
Trump’s summons to “Stop the Steal” had galvanized a Stop the Steal group on
Facebook, “realizing at one point 100 new members every 10 seconds. The group
swelled to 320,000 followers before Facebook shut it down.”441 In the words of
Representative Liz Cheney, Republican from Wyoming, “There’s no question
the [P]resident formed the mob. . . . The [P]resident incited the mob. The [P]resident addressed the mob. He lit the flame.”442 Here, then, was frightening affirmation of the power of political speech to spread misinformation and to have
individuals act with maniacal conviction upon that misinformation. Gripped with
concern that President Trump within his final two weeks in office might use social media to incite further civil unrest, Twitter decided to permanently suspend
his account.443 Earlier, Facebook had done the same.444
While these social media companies had silenced President Trump, the Supreme Court would have regarded his statements as fully protected because they
were prominent examples of political speech. His accusations, it bears emphasizing, were not only instances of political speech but political speech voiced by
the highest-ranking public official in the nation, and thus entitled to the strongest
of protection. The degree to which President Trump’s statements would have
been protected are worthy of reflection. President Trump’s accusations about
fraud bristled with inflammatory rhetoric and were issued by someone who enjoyed the political trappings of a monarch. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that
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they had caused significant damage to the public’s faith in the integrity of the
electoral process, and, by extension, constitutional democracy itself. But because
President Trump’s assertions were political speech, they would not have been
denied constitutional protection unless they amounted to a clear and present danger, an unrealistic possibility.445 To qualify as a clear and present danger, President Trump’s allegations of voter fraud would have to have been construed as
advocacy of imminent unlawful conduct, and such conduct would have to have
been likely to occur.446 Were President Trump’s tweets commercial speech—
say, advertisements for his Trump Hotels—they would have received lesser protection than political speech such that the advertisements would have been denied protection simply for being false.447
Even if wholly without merit, President Trump’s charges about voter fraud
would have been entitled to the highest protection. Partly as a consequence of
such protection, many Americans now agree with him that constitutional democracy had faltered during the presidential election. According to a Quinnipiac poll,
77% of Republicans believe there was “widespread voter fraud during the November [presidential] election.”448 A Monmouth University poll similarly determined that 77% of Trump supporters feel that Biden’s victory was attributable
to “fraud.”449 An Economist/YouGov poll recorded that a stunning 88% of
Trump voters believe that Biden’s victory was “not legitimate.”450 Finally, a poll
conducted by the universities at Northeastern, Harvard, Rutgers, and Northwestern concluded that 33% of all voters believe that Trump in fact won the election
or are not sure who won legitimately.451
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CONCLUSION
The assumption that so-called political speech deserves heightened protection has been a mainstay of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. This Article has
argued that such protection is unjustified. Despite efforts by scholars and jurists,
there is little evidence to suggest that the Constitution’s framers believed that
political speech was entitled to the strongest protection. Nor is there a viable
philosophical argument from self-government that can be enlisted by political
speech. Even if political speech were entitled to special protection, the concept
of “political” speech is too difficult to define. The Supreme Court, moreover, has
provided little guidance for what qualifies as political speech. In addition, this
Article has shown that the Court’s practice of privileging political speech has
frequently come at the cost of undermining civility and the dignity of individuals.

22 NEV. L.J. 803

866

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]

[Vol. 22:2

